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Finite Model Theory and Finite Variable Logics
Abstract
In this dissertation, I investigate some questions about the model theory of finite structures. One goal is
to better understand the expressive power of various logical languages, including first order logic (FO),
over this class. A second, related, goal is to determine which results from classical model theory remain
true when relativized to the class, F, of finite structures. As it is well known that many such results
become false, I also consider certain weakened generalizations of classical results.
I prove some basic results about the languages Lk∃ and Lk∞ω∃, the existential fragments of the finite
variable logics Lk and Lk∞ω. I show that there are finite models whose Lk(∃)-theories are not finitely
axiomatizable. I also establish the optimality of a normal form for Lk∞ω∃, and separate certain fragments
of this logic. I introduce a notion of a "generalized preservation theorem", and establish certain partial
positive results. I then show that existential preservation fails for the language Lk∞ω, both over F and over
the class of all structures. I also examine other preservation properties, e.g. for classes closed under
homomorphisms.
In the final chapter, I investigate the finite model theory of propositional modal logic. I show that, in
contrast to more expressive logics, model logic is "well behaved" over F. In particular, I establish that
various theorems that are true over the class of all structures also hold over F. I prove that, over F a class
of models is FO-definable and closed under bisimulations if it is defined by a modal FO sentence. In
addition, I prove that, over F, a class is defined by a modal sentence and closed under extensions if it is
defined by a ◊-modal sentence.
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ABSTRACT

Finite Model Theory and Finite Variable Logics
Eric Rosen
Supervisor: Scott Weinstein

In this dissertation, I investigate some questions about the model theory of nite structures. One goal is to better understand the expressive power of various logical languages,
including rst-order logic (FO), over this class. A second, related, goal is to determine
which results from classical model theory remain true when relativized to the class, F , of
nite structures. As it is well-known that many such results become false, I also consider
certain weakened generalizations of classical results.
I prove some basic results about the languages Lk (9) and Lk1! (9), the existential
fragments of the nite variable logics Lk and Lk1! . I show that there are nite models
whose Lk (9)-theories are not nitely axiomatizable. I also establish the optimality of a
normal form for Lk1! (9), and separate certain fragments of this logic. I introduce a notion
of a `generalized preservation theorem', and establish certain partial positive results. I
then show that existential preservation fails for the language L!1! , both over F and over
the class of all structures. I also examine other preservation properties, e.g. for classes
closed under homomorphisms.
In the nal chapter, I investigate the nite model theory of propositional modal logic.
I show that, in contrast to more expressive logics, modal logic is `well-behaved' over F . In
particular, I establish that various theorems that are true over the class of all structures
also hold over F . I prove that, over F , a class of models is FO-de nable and closed under
bisimulations i it is de ned by a modal FO sentence. In addition, I prove that, over F ,
a class is de ned by a modal sentence and closed under extensions i it is de ned by a
3-modal sentence.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Finite model theory investigates the model theory of nite structures. This subject interacts with a variety of elds from math, logic, and computer science, including classical
model theory, graph theory, and complexity theory. The di erent areas and aspects of
nite model theory are uni ed by an interest in the expressive power of logical languages.
In this dissertation, I pursue model theoretic questions pertaining to de nability, paying
particular attention to preservation theorems. Some of these problems are just nite versions of results from classical model theory. That is, we can ask whether a classical theorem
remains true when restricted to the class, F , of nite models. Other questions are variations on standard ideas. Chapters 3 and 4, for example, examine preservation theorems
involving languages other than rst-order logic.
It is well known that many theorems from classical model theory become false over
the class of nite models (see 14]). For example, the Los-Tarski theorem states that a
rst-order sentence de nes a class of models that is closed under extensions if and only if
it is equivalent to an existential sentence. Tait 23] showed that this proposition becomes
false when relativized to the class F . That is, there is a sentence, ', such that Modf ('),
the class of nite models of ', is closed under extensions but ' is not equivalent over F to
any existential sentence. As a result of these kinds of `failures', it would be interesting to
nd classical theorems that remain true over F . But `negative' results can also be viewed
as raising new problems pertaining to what we call generalized preservation theorems. For
example, Tait's example suggests that we look for some alternative characterization of the
1

rst-order de nable classes of models that are closed under extensions. Chapter 3 contains
some results in this direction. I also investigate preservation theorems for other logics
prominent in nite model theory.
The remainder of this introduction provides some information about more general aspects of nite model theory that provide a setting for what follows. Below, I briey discuss
the importance of logical languages other than rst-order logic. In Section 1, I then describe preservation theorems in more detail, and briey summarize the topics covered in
the remaining chapters. Section 2 contains notation, background information, preliminary
de nitions, and some basic results. Section 3 describes the connection between logical
equivalence and Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games.
Over the class of nite models, central results of classical model theory either become
obviously false, such as the Compactness theorem, or meaningless, like the LowenheimSkolem theorem. The failure of compactness, in particular, means that most standard
proofs of classical results are invalid over F : Furthermore, it has been shown that, when
relativized to the class F , many of these results actually become false, including the LosTarksi theorem, the Beth de nability theorem, Craig's interpolation theorem (see 14]),
and Lyndon's lemma (see 2]). In addition, many natural and computationally simple
properties, such as parity and graph connectedness, are not expressible in FO. As a consequence, rst-order logic (FO) is not as natural and attractive, over F , as it is in the
general case.
A central motivation for the investigation of other logics has been the desire to nd
logical characterizations of computational complexity classes. An important early result
from Fagin 10] says that a property (that is, a class of models) is in NP i it is de nable by
an existential second-order sentence. Since then, Immerman and others have shown that,
over the class of ordered nite structures, many other complexity classes are captured, in
this sense, by di erent logics. This research has highlighted the interest of a variety of
xed point logics, which extend FO by adding some sort of recursion operator.
Barwise 6] showed that, over a xed structure, every formula in least xed point logic
is equivalent to a formula in L!1! , in nitary nite variable logic, which is de ned below.
Kolaitis and Vardi 19] observed that this remains true over the class F . Although nite
variable logic looks rather strange because of the way in which variables are reused, it has
2

been useful for proving results about the expressive power of xed point logics, since there
is a nice algebraic characterization of logical de nability for the language. From a very
di erent point of view, others (see 4]) have argued for the relevance of nite variable logic
to modal logic. Because of these connections, as well as my belief in the intrinsic interest
of this logic, it has been a orded considerable attention in this dissertation. Chapter 2, in
particular, is devoted to basic questions about the model theory of the existential fragments
of Lk and Lk1! .
Various kinds of questions arise about the expressive power of logical languages. As
mentioned above, Fagin and Immerman have established close connections between the
complexity of describing a property of nite structures in a logical language and the complexity of computing the property on a Turing machine, or some other abstract model of
computation. A major open problem is to determine whether there is a logic that can
express exactly those properties that are in P. Given two logics, L and L0, we can also ask
about their relative expressive power, that is, is every sentence ' in L equivalent to some
sentence  in L0 ? Finally, given a single property, such as graph planarity, and a logic, L,
we can ask whether there is a sentence ' in L that expresses the property.
To show that a property can be de ned in L, it suces to exhibit a sentence that
expresses it. On the other hand, negative results require a more general method. Over the
class of all structures, one generally uses compactness over F , these kinds of results are
most often established using Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse type games. This technique, which also
works in the classical setting, plays an important role in nite model theory, and has been
applied to logics other than FO, including, especially, nite variable logics and fragments
thereof. Some of these games are de ned in Section 3.

1.1 Preservation theorems
Classical preservation theorems establish a connection between syntactic and semantic
properties of rst-order logic. In particular, they are propositions of the following form.
A class of models, C , is FO-de nable and closed under `preserved under'] some
speci ed algebraic operation i C is de ned by a FO-sentence of some speci ed
syntactic form.
3

Thus, the Los-Tarski theorem relates classes closed under extensions to existential sentences. The Homomorphism preservation theorem states that a class C is FO-de nable
and closed under homomorphisms i it is de ned by a positive existential sentence.
We remarked above that one aspect of nite model theory has been the attempt to
determine which classical theorems remain valid over the class of nite structures. It was
also noted that essentially every known answer is negative. A fundamental motivation for
this dissertation has been to try to nd positive model theoretic results that hold over
F . To this end, we introduce a generalization of the notion of a preservation theorem
in order to formulate certain weaker versions of classical theorems that we would like to
show remain true over F . The starting point for our investigation is Tait's result that
the Los-Tarski theorem fails nitely. This led us to ask whether there is a natural logic,
stronger than FO, such that every FO-de nable class that is closed under extensions is
de ned by an `existential' sentence of this logic.
This question also suggests that we investigate preservation theorems for these stronger
logics. For example, if there is a logic L that contains FO and has an existential preservation
theorem over F , then the answer to the previous question must be yes. One of the main
results of this dissertation is that existential preservation does not hold for L!1! , either
over F or over all structures.
Chapter 2 contains some basic results about the model theory of the languages Lk (9)
and Lk1! (9), the existential fragments of the nite variable logics Lk and Lk1! . We show
that there are nite structures whose Lk (9)-theories are not nitely axiomatizable. We
also establish the optimality of a normal form for Lk1! (9), due to Kolaitis and Vardi, and
separate certain fragments of this language.
Chapter 3 discusses preservation theorems for classes closed under extensions. Section
1 establishes some generalized preservation theorems for fragments of rst-order logic.
In Section 2, we prove that existential preservation fails for L!1! (9). In Chapter 4, we
examine generalized preservation theorems for other classes of models, including those
that are `monotone' and those that are closed under homomorphisms.
Chapter 5 initiates the investigation of the nite model theory of modal logic, which,
it is well known, can be viewed as a fragment of FO. The results here indicate that, in
contrast to stronger languages, modal logic is `well-behaved' over F . Thus, we prove that
4

some preservation theorems, due to van Benthem and his collaborators, remain true over F .
A somewhat open-ended question raised by this work is the extent to which these arguments
can be generalized to apply to stronger fragments of FO, especially those considered in 5].
Recently, connections have emerged between modal logic and certain areas of theoretical
computer science. We hope that some of our results, and the techniques developed here,
will be of interest to researchers in these elds.

1.2 Preliminaries
Let F  be the collection of nite structures of signature : We will assume that the universe
of any A 2 F  is an initial segment of N = f0 1 2 : : :g: We will often use A B : : : etc. to
denote both a structure and its universe when no confusion is likely to result. We assume
that the signature  is nite and contains no function symbols we suppress mention of 
when no confusion is likely to result. A boolean query C  F is a class of nite structures
that is closed under isomorphisms. We use C to range over boolean queries. In Chapters
2 and 3, we focus on boolean queries which are closed under extensions.

Denition 1 EXT = fC  F j 8A B 2 C  if A 2 C and A  B then B 2 Cg:
Let L be a logical language and let ' be a sentence of L: Mod(') = fA j A j= 'g is the
L-class determined by ' and Modf (') = fA 2 F j A j= 'g is the boolean query expressed
by ': We say that C is L-denable, just in case it is the boolean query expressed by some
sentence ' 2 L: We will often use L to denote the set of L-de nable boolean queries.
We let FO denote rst-order logic, L1! , the usual in nitary extension of rst-order logic
which allows conjunction and disjunction over arbitrary sets of formulas, Lk , the fragment
of FO consisting of those formulas all of whose variables both free and bound are among
x1 : : : xk  and similarly Lk1! , the k-variable fragment of L1!  L!1! = Sk2! Lk1! : We
let FO(9) denote the set of existential formulas of FO, that is, those formulas obtained
by closing the set of atomic formulas and negated atomic formulas under the operations
of conjunction, disjunction, and existential quanti cation. We de ne L1! (9), the set of
existential formulas of L1! , similarly, but require, in addition, closure under in nitary
conjunction and disjunction. We let Lk (9) consist of the formulas common to FO(9) and
Lk and we de ne Lk1! (9) and L!1! (9) similarly.
5

A Datalog(6= :) program P is a collection of rules of the form

0 ; 1 : : : k :
Such a rule has a head, 0  and a body, 1 : : : k : Each of the i is either an inequality or
a literal over the signature    where  and  are disjoint  consists of the extensional
relations and constants of P and  consists of the intensional relations of P. The heads of
all rules are built from intensional relations and intensional relations occur only positively
throughout P. The program contains a distinguished intensional relation R of arity n 0
and determines an n-ary query over structures in F  . The value of this query for a given
A 2 F  is the value of R when the program is viewed as determining least- xed points for
each of the intensional relations with respect to a simultaneous induction associated with
the program. The reader may consult 1, 18] for further details and discussion. As with
logics, we use Datalog(6= :) to refer to the class of queries computed by Datalog(6= :)
programs as well as to the class of programs themselves. Datalog programs are de ned
similarly except that all the i are restricted to be positive literals, even those built from
extensional relations. Observe that Datalog(6= :) is contained in the least xed-point
extension of rst-order logic (LFP).
In our current notation, the failure of the Los-Tarski Theorem over nite structures
may be expressed as:
FO \ EXT 6 FO(9):
This raises the question of whether FO \ EXT is contained in the existential fragment
of some stronger logic. The following proposition completely characterizes the relative
expressive power of the existential fragments of the logics in which we are interested.

Proposition 1

FO(9) Datalog(6= :) L!1! (9) L1! (9) = EXT:
Proof. It is easy to see that every query in FO(9) can be expressed by a program in
Datalog(6= :) which makes use of no recursion. It is well-known that this inclusion is
strict, for example, the query (s t)-connectivity is expressible in Datalog but not in FO.
The inclusion of Datalog(6= :) in L!1! (9) has been noted by Afrati, Cosmadakis, and
Yannakakis 1] (see also 18]) the argument to show this is a variant of the proof that
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least xed-point logic is contained in L!1! over the class of nite structures (see 19]).
Afrati, Cosmadakis, and Yannakakis 1] also exhibit queries which witness the separation
of Datalog(6= :) and L!1! (9), even over the class of polynomial time computable queries.
The identity between L1! (9) and EXT has been noted by Kolaitis and independently by
Lo (see 1] and 20]). Finally, it is easy to construct polynomial time computable boolean
queries in EXT which are not in L!1! . For example, let C be the query over the signature
fE s tg of source-target graphs that says that there is an E -path from s to t whose length
is less than half the cardinality of the structure. It is clear that C 2 EXT. It is also easy to
verify that C is not in L!1! (and therefore not in L!1! (9)) by a straightforward application
of the k-pebble Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game which we review below.
The above proposition together with the failure of the Los-Tarski Theorem in the nite
case suggests the following questions.
1. Is FO \ EXT  L!1! (9)?
2. Is FO \ EXT  Datalog(6= :)?
3. Is L!1! \ EXT  L!1! (9)?
Clearly a positive answer to the second or third question would imply a positive answer
to the rst. In Chapter 3, we provide partial positive answers to the rst and second
questions, and a negative answer to the third question. Recently, Martin Grohe 13] has
proved that the answer to question 1 is no.

1.3 Logical equivalence and Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games
Let L be one of the logical languages we have de ned above. Given a structure A the
L-theory of A is the collection of sentences of L which are satis ed by A: We say that A
is L-equivalent to B , if and only if, the L-theory of A is equal to the L-theory of B and
we say that A is L-compatible with B if and only if, the L-theory of A is contained in the
L-theory of B: Note that if L is closed under negation, then the relations of L-equivalence
and L-compatibility coincide, whereas for languages like Lk (9) and Lk1! (9) these relations
are distinct. We use the notations k , k1! , k , and k1! for Lk -equivalence, Lk1! equivalence, Lk (9)-compatibility, and Lk1! (9)-compatibility, respectively. More generally,
7

if a and b are j -tuples of elements from A and B , then we write (A a) k (B b) i for all
formulas '(x) 2 Lk (9), if A j= 'a], then B j= 'b].
The main tool for studying these relations are re nements of the Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse
game. Barwise 6] characterized Lk1! -equivalence in terms of partial isomorphisms, while
Immerman 17] and Poizat 21] provided related pebble game characterizations of Lk equivalence. Kolaitis and Vardi 18] characterized compatibility in the negation free fragment of Lk1! (9) both in terms of collections of partial homomorphisms as well as in terms
of a one-sided, positive version of the pebble game. Below we use a minor variant of the
approach in 18] to characterize Lk1! (9)-compatibility.
A set I of partial isomorphisms from A to B is said to have the k-back-and-]forth
property if for all f 2 I such that the domain of f has cardinality < k, and all a 2 A
b 2 B ], there is a function g 2 I such that f  g and a 2 dom(g )b 2 rng(g )]. (That is,
the k-forth property is the one-sided version, going forth from A of the k-back-and-forth
property.)
Barwise 6] proved the following proposition which gives an algebraic characterization
of Lk1! -equivalence.

Proposition 2 (Barwise 6]) Let A and B be structures of signature  and let h be the

map with dom(h) = fcA j c 2  g such that h(cA ) = cB for all c 2 : The following
conditions are equivalent.
1. A k1! B .
2. There is a non-empty set I of partial isomorphisms from A to B such that
(a) I is closed under subfunctions
(b) I has the k-back-and-forth property
(c) for all f 2 I, f  h is a partial isomorphism from A to B:

In a similar spirit, Kolaitis and Vardi 18] gave an algebraic characterization of the
compatibility relation for the negation free fragment of Lk1! (9) in terms of collections of
partial homomorphisms with the k-forth property. We adapt their approach to the case of
Lk1! (9) in the following theorem.
8

Proposition 3 (Kolaitis and Vardi 18]) Let A and B be structures of signature  and

let h be the map with dom(h) = fcA j c 2  g such that h(cA ) = cB for all c 2 : The
following conditions are equivalent.
1. A k1! B .
2. There is a non-empty set I of partial isomorphisms from A to B such that
(a) I is closed under subfunctions
(b) I has the k-forth property
(c) for all f 2 I, f  h is a partial isomorphism from A to B:

Both Propositions 2 and 3 can be expressed more colorfully in terms of pebble games.
This approach to Lk -equivalence was introduced by Immerman 17] and Poizat 21] and
as an approach to Lk1! (9)-compatibility by Kolaitis and Vardi 18]. In order to state the
relevant results in a suitably re ned form, we require the notion of the quantier rank of a
formula. We state this de nition for formulas of L1! since all the languages we consider
are fragments of it.

Denition 2 The quantier rank of ' 2 L1!  qr('), is dened by the following induction.
1. qr(') = 0 if ' is atomic
2. qr(:') = qr(')

V

W

3. qr( ) = qr( ) = sup(fqr(') j ' 2 g)
4. qr(9x') = qr(8x') = qr(') + 1:

The n-round, k-pebble Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game on A and B is played between two
players, Spoiler and Duplicator, with k pairs of pebbles, (1 1) : : : (k  k ). The Spoiler
begins each round by choosing a pair of pebbles (i  i) that may or may not be in play
on the boards A and B . He (by convention, the Spoiler is male, the Duplicator female)
either places i on an element of A, or i on an element of B . The Duplicator then plays
the remaining pebble on the other model. The Spoiler wins the game if after any round
m  n the function f from A to B which sends the element pebbled by i to the element
9

pebbled by i and preserves the denotations of constants, is not a partial isomorphism
otherwise, the Duplicator wins the game. The n-round 9k -game is the one-sided version of
the n-round, k-pebble Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game in which the Spoiler is restricted to play
a pebble i into A at every round while the Duplicator responds by playing i into B  the
winning condition remains the same. Both the k-pebble Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game and its
one-sided variant have in nite versions, which we call the eternal k-pebble EhrenfeuchtFraisse game and the eternal 9k -game. In these games, the play continues through a
sequence of rounds of order type !: The Spoiler wins the game, if and only if, he wins at
the nth -round for some n 2 ! as above otherwise, the Duplicator wins. In describing the
play of pebble games below, we will often use S to refer to the Spoiler and D to refer to the
Duplicator. We will also often use i  i etc. to refer to both pebbles and the elements
they pebble at a given round of play.
The foregoing n-round games may be used to characterize equivalence and compatibility
of structures with respect to Lk sentences and Lk (9) sentences of quanti er rank n and
the eternal games may be used to characterize equivalence and compatibility of structures
with respect to Lk1! sentences and Lk1! (9) sentences. Given structures A and B we let
A kn B , if and only if, A and B satisfy the same sentences of Lk of quanti er rank  n
and we let A kn B , if and only if, every sentence of Lk (9) of quanti er rank  n which is
true in A is also true in B: The following two propositions use the n-round pebble games
to characterize these relations. The rst is due to Immerman 17] and Poizat 21] and the
second is essentially due to Kolaitis and Vardi 18].

Proposition 4 (Immerman 17], Poizat 21]) For all structures A and B the following conditions are equivalent.
1. A kn B:
2. The Duplicator has a winning strategy for the n-round, k-pebble Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse
game on A and B:

Proposition 5 (Kolaitis and Vardi 18]) For all structures A and B the following
conditions are equivalent.
1. A kn B:

10

2. The Duplicator has a winning strategy for the n-round 9k -game on A and B with
the Duplicator playing on B:

The next proposition gives a characterization of the in nitary equivalence and compatibility relations in terms of the eternal games. It is essentially due to Kolaitis and Vardi
19, 18].

Proposition 6 (Kolaitis and Vardi 19, 18]) 1. For all structures A and B the following conditions are equivalent.

(a) A k1! B:
(b) The Duplicator has a winning strategy for the eternal k-pebble EhrenfeuchtFraisse game on A and B:
2. For all structures A and B the following conditions are equivalent.
(a) A k1! B:
(b) The Duplicator has a winning strategy for the eternal 9k -game on A and B
with the Duplicator playing on B:

Kolaitis and Vardi 19, 18] observed that over nite structures in nitary equivalence
and compatibility coincide with their nitary analogs.

Proposition 7 (Kolaitis and Vardi 19, 18]) 1. Let A or B be a nite structure.
Then, the following conditions are equivalent.
(a) A k1! B:
(b) A k B:
2. Let B be a nite structure. Then, the following conditions are equivalent.
(a) A k1! B:
(b) A k B:

The foregoing propositions yield the following corollaries concerning de nability.

Proposition 8 (Kolaitis and Vardi 18]) For all C  F  the following conditions are
equivalent.

11

1. C is Lk1! (9)-denable.
2. For all A 2 C and B 62 C  A6 k1! B:
3. For all A 2 C and B 62 C  A6 k B:
4. For all A 2 C and B 62 C  there is an n 2 ! such that the Spoiler has a winning
strategy for the n-round 9k -game on A and B with the Spoiler playing on A:

12

Chapter 2

Basic nite model theory for Lk(9)
and Lk1!(9)
In this chapter, we present some basic model theory for Lk , Lk1! , Lk (9), and Lk1! (9),
answering questions concerning nite axiomatizability and normal forms. Let L and L0
be logical languages and let T be a collection of sentences of L: We say that T is nitely
axiomatizable in L0, if and only if, there is a sentence ' 2 L0 such that Modf (T ) =
Modf ('): Dawar, Lindell and Weinstein 9] prove that the Lk1! -theory of any nite model
is nitely axiomatizable in Lk . As a corollary, they obtain a simple normal form for Lk1!
over F , in particular, they show that every sentence of Lk1! is equivalent to a countable
disjunction of sentences of Lk and is also equivalent to a countable conjunction of sentences
of Lk . In contrast, we show below that there are nite models whose Lk (9)-theories are
not nitely axiomatizable in Lk (9). Building on this result, we prove that the normal form
for Lk1! over F (every sentence of Lk1! is equivalent over F to a countable disjunction of
countable conjunctions of sentences of Lk ) exhibited by Kolaitis and Vardi 19] is optimal
when considered as a normal form for Lk1! (9) sentences over Lk (9).
We begin by proving that there are models whose Lk (9)-theories are not nitely axiomatizable in Lk (9). Our argument exploits the k-extension axioms, which we now describe
briey. Let  be a purely relational, nite signature. A basic k-type over the signature
 is a maximal consistent set of literals over  in the variables x1 : : : xk : A k-extension
V V
axiom of signature  is a sentence of the form 8x1 : : :xk;1 9xk ( ! 0 ), where is a
13

basic (k ; 1)-type of signature  , 0 is a basic k-type of signature  , and  0: Over a
xed signature  , the k-Gaifman theory, ;k , is the set of all k-extensions axioms of signature  . It is easy to see that, for each k, there are only nitely many k-extension axioms.
S
Gaifman 12] showed that the theory T = k ;k axiomatizes an ! -categorical model called
the random structure. Fagin 11] proved the 0-1 law for rst-order logic by showing that
every extension axiom is almost surely true over F . Fagin's result implies that almost
every A 2 F satis es the k-Gaifman theory. Immerman 17] showed that any two models
of the k-Gaifman theory are Lk -equivalent and Kolaitis and Vardi 19] made use of the
k-Gaifman theory in their proof of the 0 ; 1 law for L!1! . We make the following easy
observation.

Proposition 9 Let A j= ;k , and let B be any (nite or innite) model. Then B k1! A.

Equivalently, for all ' 2 Lk1! (9), if ' is satisable, then A j= ':

Proof. The proof follows easily from Proposition 6 by considering the eternal 9k -game on
B and A with the Duplicator playing on A: The k-Gaifman axioms essentially say that D
can extend a partial isomorphism with domain of size < k in every possible way. Therefore,
she has a winning strategy for the game.

We observe that this result yields a compactness theorem over nite structures and a
nitary analog of the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem for Lk1! (9).

Corollary 1 For every k 2 ! there is an nk 2 ! such that for every set  of sentences of

Lk1! (9),  is satisable, if and only if, every nite subset of  is satisable, if and only
if,  is satised in a model of size nk :
The next proposition establishes that there are nite structures whose Lk (9)-theory is
not nitely axiomatizable in Lk (9).

Proposition 10 For all k 2, there is a model Ak 2 F such that the Lk (9)-theory of Ak
is not nitely axiomatizable in Lk (9).

Proof. Let Ak be any nite model of the k-Gaifman theory over the language of graphs.
We show that for any n 2 ! , there is a Bkn such that Ak kn Bkn and Ak 6 kn+1 Bkn . This

14

implies that the theory of Ak cannot be axiomatized by Lk (9) sentences of quanti er rank
 n and, therefore, that it is not nitely axiomatizable in Lk (9).
For the purpose of de ning the models Bkn  we require the following notion and notation.
A basic k-type satis es the distinctness condition if for every l < k the formula xl 6=
xk 2 : Let f 1  : : : sg be a set of basic (k ; 1)-types such that
1. every basic (k ; 1)-type is equivalent to some i and
2. if i 6= j then i is not equivalent to j :
Similarly, for each 1  i  s let f i1 : : : in(i)g be a set of basic k-types each of which
extends i and satis es the distinctness condition such that
1. every basic k-type which extends i and satis es the distinctness condition is equivalent to some ij and
2. if j 6= j 0 then ij is not equivalent to ij :
0

We proceed to de ne the models Bkn : Let Bk1 be the graph on two vertices with exactly
one loop and no other edges. Thus Bk1 realizes both basic 1-types. Given that Bkn has been
de ned, we now de ne Bkn+1 as an extension of Bkn . For each (k ; 1)-tuple b of elements of
Bkn  let  (b) be the unique i such that Bkn j= ib] and let Xb = fbnbj+1 j 1  j  n( (b))g
be a set of distinct objects disjoint from Bkn : We suppose that for any distinct pair of
(k ; 1)-tuples a and b of elements of Bkn  Xa \ Xb = : Let X be the union of all the sets
Xb : We let the universe of Bkn+1 = Bkn  X: The edge relation of Bkn+1 is obtained from that
n+1 satis es
of Bkn by adding the minimal number of edges so that each k-tuple b  bbj
 (b)j .
It is easy to see that each Bkn+1 is well-de ned. We say that the height of an element b
introduced in this construction is the least n such that b 2 Bkn :
We rst show that Ak kn Bkn : By Proposition 5, it suces to describe a winning strategy for D in the n-round 9k -game with D playing on Bkn and S playing on Ak : The strategy
we describe for D will allow her to play her mth move on some b 2 Bkm , for each m  n: In
round 1, D answers the rst move of S by playing her pebble on the appropriate element of
Bk1  Bkn to create a partial isomorphism. Suppose that D has played only onto elements
of Bkm through round m where m < n: Let S choose pebble pair (l  l) to play in round
15

(m + 1): We consider two cases. If S plays l on the same element as some l , for l 6= l0,
then D must play l onto the element pebbled by l . Doing so, she obviously maintains
a partial isomorphism and succeeds in playing within Bkm+1 . On the other hand, suppose
that S plays l on a distinct element such that the elements pebbled by   l on A after
the round satisfy ij (we may need to pad the tuple pebbled by  to a tuple of length
(k ; 1) by repeating its last element, if all the pebbles are not in play at this round). Before
D plays her (m + 1)st move, the pebbles are on a tuple b (similarly padded, if necessary)
m+1 2 B m+1  thereby maintaining a
that satis es i : She then plays l on the element bbj
k
partial isomorphism. This strategy enables her to win the n-round game.
Next, we show that Ak 6 kn+1 Bkn : By Proposition 5, it suces to show that S can win
the (n +1)-round game with D playing on Bkn and S playing on Ak : We describe a strategy
for play by S which forces D to pebble an element of height at least m by the end of
round m to avoid losing at that round. It follows that S wins the (n + 1)-round game
since all elements of Bkn have height  n: S plays as follows. He rst places his k-pebbles
on a set of k distinct elements which form a k-clique, that is, for every pair of distinct
pebbled elements a and a0  Ak j= E (a a0): S may play in this way since Ak j= ;k : By our
construction above, if b b0 2 Bkn are distinct elements of the same height, Bkn 6j= E (b b0):
It follows immediately that any r-clique in Bkn contains an element of height at least r:
Therefore, if S has not won by round k D has pebbled an element of height at least k by
the end of that round. Note that in case (n +1)  k we are done, since at round (n +1) D
will be unable to play onto an element of height at least (n + 1) to form an (n + 1)-clique.
We proceed to describe the strategy for S's continuing play under the assumption that
k < (n + 1): Suppose that through round m k  m < (n + 1) D has played a pebble
onto an element of height at least m and that the k pebbles S has played lie on distinct
elements of Ak which form a k-clique. We show how S can play to ensure that D must
play onto an element of height at least (m + 1) at round (m + 1) if she is to prevent S
from winning at this round, and leave the round with a k-clique pebbled. Suppose that i
is pebbling an element b of height greater than the height of any other element pebbled in
Bkn at round m: By our hypothesis, the height of b is at least m: Pick j 6= i (recall that
2  k) and let a 2 Ak be the element pebbled by j : S picks up j and places it on an
a0 2 Ak such that
0

0
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1. Ak j= E (a a) $ :E (a0 a0) and
2. for every a00 2 Ak on which one of the remaining (k ; 1) pebbles lies, a0 6= a00 and
Ak j= E (a0 a00) ^ E (a00 a0):
The existence of such an a0 follows from the fact that Ak j= ;k : We claim that to avoid
losing at this round, D must play her pebble j onto an element b0 of height greater than
the height of b and hence of height at least (m + 1): Let b00 be the element pebbled by
j at round m: By our construction, each element of Bkn is connected to at most (k ; 1)
elements of lesser height. Therefore, from the hypotheses that S had pebbled a k-clique
at round m and that b is an element of maximal height pebbled by D at that round, we
may conclude that the only element of height  the height of b adjacent to b onto which D
could play j is b00 itself. But this play would fail to maintain a partial isomorphism with
the elements S has now pebbled at round (m + 1) by the rst condition we have imposed
on the choice of a0 above. Therefore, to avoid losing at round (m + 1) D must pebble an
element of height at least (m + 1):
The next result follows immediately.

Corollary 2 There are innitely many formulas of Lk (9) which are pairwise inequivalent
over F .

We now consider Lk1! (9)-theories and normal forms for Lk1! (9) sentences over F . We
let Thk9 (A) denote the Lk1! (9)-theory of A: Before proceeding, we de ne the following
fragments of Lk1! (9).

V
V
W
W
2. Let Lk (9) = f j  =  for some   Lk (9)g.
VW
V
W
3. Let ( Lk (9)) = f j  =  for some countable   Lk (9)g.
WV
W
V
4. Let ( Lk (9)) = f j  =  for some countable   Lk (9)g.
Proposition 11 For all nite structures A, there is a  2 V Lk (9) such that Modf () =
1. Let Lk (9) = f j  =  for some   Lk (9)g.

Modf (Thk9 (A)):
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Proof. Observe that Modf (Thk9 (A)) = fB 2 F j A k1! B g: Let CA = F ; Modf (Thk9(A)):
By Proposition 7, for each B 2 CA  there is a sentence 'B 2 Lk (9) such that A j= 'B and
B 6j= 'B . Let  = VB 2CA 'B : It is easy to verify that Modf () = Modf (Thk9 (A)):

Kolaitis and Vardi 18] obtained a normal form for the negation free fragment of Lk1! (9)
over F . It is easy to extend their result to Lk1! (9) and to provide a dual normal form as
well. We codify these normal forms in the next proposition.

Proposition 12 (Kolaitis and Vardi 18]) For every sentence ' 2 Lk1! (9), there is a

 2 W(V Lk (9)) and a

2

V(W Lk (9)) such that Modf (') = Modf () = Modf ( ):

Proof. Let C = Modf ('). By Proposition 8, for each A 2 C  B 2 F ; C , there is a sentence
AB 2 Lk (9) such that A j= AB and B 6j= AB . Let  = WA2C (VB62C AB ) and let
V W
= B 62C ( A2C AB ): It is easy to verify that the proposition holds for this choice of 
and :

V

W

Next we show that the fragments Lk (9) and Lk (9) are closed under nite conjunction, nite disjunction, and existential quanti cation over F . This means that if an
Lk1! (9)-de nable query cannot be expressed in either V Lk (9) or W Lk (9), then it is only
de nable using both an in nitary conjunction and an in nitary disjunction.

Proposition 13 The languages V Lk (9) and W Lk (9) are both closed under nite conjunction, nite disjunction, and existential quantication over F .

Proof. Let  = f'i (x y) j i 2 ! g be a set of formulas of Lk (9). We show that if (y ) =
V
V
9x  then (y ) is equivalent over F to some formula 0 (y ) 2 Lk (9): (The other closure
V
V
conditions may be easily veri ed.) Let m = 0lm 'l (x y) and let 0 (y ) = m2! 9x m :
We show 0 is equivalent to : It is obvious that  implies 0 . Let A 2 F and a 2 A be such
that A j= 0 a]. Because A is nite, there is some a0 2 A such that for arbitrarily large m,
A j= ma0 a]. Therefore A j= Vm2! ma0 a], and 0 implies .

V

W

Below we show that the query classes Lk (9) and Lk (9) are proper subsets of
V(W Lk (9)) and that neither of V Lk (9) and W Lk (9) is a subset of the other. We rst
V
W
give necessary and sucient conditions for classes to be de nable in Lk (9) and Lk (9),
and prove a lemma from Kolaitis and Vardi 18] that we need below.
18

Proposition 14 1. A class C is denable in V Lk (9) i for all B 62 C , there is a 'B 2
Lk (9) such that B 6j= 'B and for all A 2 C  A j= 'B .
W
2. A class C is denable in Lk (9) i for all A 2 C , there is a 'A 2 Lk (9) such that
A j= 'A and for all B 62 C  B 6j= 'A .

V

Proof. To prove 1., suppose that C is de ned by the sentence n2! n , and that B 62 C .
Then there is some m such that B 6j= m . Let 'B be this m . In the other direction,
V
observe that the sentence ' = B 62C 'B de nes C . The proof of 2. is similar.

Lemma 1 (Kolaitis and Vardi 18]) The relation

k is polynomial time computable.

Proof. Let A and B be models of signature  . We de ne hA B i to be the following model,
with signature   fQxg, where Qx is a unary predicate not in  . It is the disjoint union
of A and B , with the extension of the predicate Qx interpreted as the universe of B . It
is easy to see that, given a standard encoding of the models A and B on Turing machines
(e.g. see 9]), an encoding of hA B i can be produced in polynomial time.
Modifying an idea from Dawar, Lindell, and Weinstein 9], we now show that there is
an LFP sentence  such that for all A and B , hA B i j=  i A k B . It is well known (see
14]) that every LFP query can be computed in polynomial time. Composing the function
that outputs a representation of hA B i with the function that computes the truth value
of  then yields the desired algorithm.
Let R(x1 : : : xk  y1 : : : yk ) be the 2k-ary relation on models hA B i such that hA B i j=
R(a1 : : : ak  b1 : : : bk) i each ai is in A, each bi is in B, and (A a) 6 k (B b). We rst
show that R(x y) can be expressed in LFP. Let  = f 1 : : : tg be the set of all atomic
formulas over  with free variables among x1  : : : xk . Given any k-tuple a  A and ktuple b  B , (A a) 6 k0 (B b) i there is a 2  such that A j= a] i B 6j= b]. In
general, (A a) 6 kn+1 (B b) i there is an a0 2 A and an i  k such that for all b0 2 B ,
(A a0) 6 kn (B b0 ), where a0 and b0 are the k-tuples obtained from a and b by replacing
the ith component by a0 and b0, respectively. Then the least xed point of the following
formula de nes the desired relation, R(x y ):

^

_

_

 (x y ) = lfp (:Qxi ^ Qyi ) ^ ( ( x] $ : y]) _ 9xi 8yi (:Qxi ^ (Qyi ! R(x y))))]
ik
 2
ik
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Observe that A k B i for each k-tuple a  A, there is a k-tuple b  B such that
(A a) k (B b): If A 6 k B , then there is a sentence ' 2 Lk (9) such that A j= ' and B 6j= '.
Then for any a  A and b  B , (A a) j= 'a] and (B b) 6j= 'b]. In the other direction,
assume that A k B and a  A. Suppose that for each b  B , there is a formula b (x) such
V
that (A a) j= b (x) and (B b) 6j= b (x). Then = 9x bB b (x) is an Lk (9) sentence such
that A j= and B 6j= , a contradiction. Finally, let  be the following sentence.

 = 8x1 : : :xk (

^ :Qx ! 9y

ik

i

1

^

: : :yk ( Qyi ^ : (x y)))
ik

This completes the proof.

Proposition 15 For each k

V
W
C 2 Lk (9) ; Lk (9).

2, there is a polynomial time computable boolean query

Proof. Let k 2 be given and let the graph Ak be a model of the k-Gaifman theory. Let T
V
V
be the Lk (9)-theory of Ak and let  = T: Clearly,  2 Lk (9): Let C = Modf (): It is easy
to see that C = fB 2 F j Ak k B g thus, by Lemma 1, C is polynomial time computable. In
the proof of Proposition 10, we showed that for every satis able ' 2 Lk (9) Modf (') 6 C :
W
This implies that for every 2 Lk (9) C 6= Modf ( ).

Proposition 16 There is a polynomial time computable boolean query C 2 W L2(9) such
that for all k 2 ! C 62
W Lk (9) ; V Lk (9).

V Lk (9): In consequence, for each k

2, there is a class

C 2

Proof. Over the signature  = fE s tg, let C = fA j there is a path from s to tg, the class
W
of (s t)-connected graphs. This class is clearly in L2(9): As noted earlier, it is in Datalog,
V
and, hence, polynomial time computable. From Proposition 14, to show that C 62 Lk (9),
it suces to show that there is a B 62 C such that for all n 2 ! , there is an An 2 C such
that An kn B . This latter condition is equivalent to D's possessing a winning strategy
for the n-round 9k -game on An and B . We construct B to give her the greatest possible
freedom in choosing her moves. Let M be any graph such that M j= ;k+1 , and let Ms
(resp. Mt ) be obtained from M by requiring that s (resp. t) denote a loop-free element.
We de ne B to be the disjoint union of Ms and Mt , thus insuring that B 62 C :
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For each n, let An be the simple chain from s to t of length 2n+2 . The basic idea is
that by choosing the chain to be long enough, S will not be able to witness the existence
of a path from s to t in only n moves. Let d(x y ) be the natural distance function on An .
We now describe D's strategy. In each round m, D chooses to play on an element of Ms
i S just played a pebble on a 2 An such that either (i) d(s a)  2(n+2);m  or (ii) there
is a j such that j is on an element of Ms and d(j  a)  2(n+2);m . She then plays her
pebble on an element of the appropriate component of B so that she maintains a partial
isomorphism among the pebbles on that component. It is easy to see that this is possible
because Ms and Mt are models of ;k+1 :
In order to establish that this is a winning strategy, it suces to verify the following
two claims.
1. In each round l  n, if D plays a pebble i on Ms , then i is not adjacent to t on
An . Similarly for Mt and s.
2. After each round l, for all pairs of pebbles fi  j g, if An j= E (i j ), then i and
j are on the same component of B .
We argue, by induction, that if D plays i on Ms in round m, then d(s i)  (2(n+2);1 +
2(n+2);2 + : : : + 2(n+2);m ) < 2n+2 ; 1. Since d(s t) = 2n+2 , this establishes that An 6j=
E (i t). In round 1, D plays i on Ms i d(s i)  2(n+2);1 . Suppose that in round m +1
D plays i on Ms . Then either d(s i)  2(n+2);m or there is an j such that j is on Ms ,
d(i j )  2(n+2);(m+1), and, by induction hypothesis, d(s j )  (2(n+2);1 + 2(n+2);2 +
: : : + 2(n+2);m ). In both cases, the induction condition is maintained. The second part
of Claim 1 follows from the fact that in round m, if D plays i on Mt , then S must have
played i such that d(s i) > 2(n+2);m > 1.
To prove Claim 2, observe that at each round m, if i 2 Ms , and j 2 Mt , then
d(i j ) 2(n+2);m > 1. The details are similar to the previous argument.
The next result shows that the normal form for Lk1! (9) over F given in Proposition
12 is optimal.

Proposition 17 For all k

V

W

( Lk (9)  Lk (9)).

2, there is a class
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C  F

WV

such that C 2 ( Lk (9)) ;

Proof. The proof of this proposition is a synthesis of the proofs of the preceding two
results. We de ne a set of models fA1  A2 : : :g which are pairwise Lk (9)-incompatible
such that for each i, the Lk (9)-theory of Ai is not nitely axiomatizable in Lk (9). We then
W
let C = fB j 9i(Ai k B )g. The arguments to show that this class is neither in Lk (9) nor
V
in Lk (9) are variants of the proofs of Propositions 15 and 16.
We de ne each model Ai as an expansion of a homeomorphic image of a graph which
is a model of the (k + 1)-Gaifman theory. To clarify the exposition, we also add a unary
predicate V to the signature to label the original vertices of the graph. Let R be a nite
graph that veri es ;k+1  observe that R also veri es ;k . Each Ai is obtained from R
by replacing all edges which are not loops by pairwise disjoint paths of length i. (Where
there is a two-way, undirected edge, a single undirected path is inserted, rather than two
directed paths.) If i = 1 then A1 is just the expansion of R, with signature fExy V xg,
such that V A1 = R. If i > 1, then the universe of Ai is the set R  ffa b j g j a b 2 R R j=
Eab and 1  j < ig. (We have labeled each new vertex by a set of size 3.) If a and b
are connected in R, then in Ai there is a path of length i from a to b along the vertices
fa b 1g : : : fa b i ; 1g. Again, we set V Ai = R. Observe that each vertex fa b j g is
connected to exactly two other vertices. Also, if a b 2 V Ai  a 6= b, then d(a b) i.
W
To verify that C is not in Lk (9), it suces to show that there is a model A 2 C and a
sequence B 1  B 2  : : : disjoint from C , such that for each n A kn B n . Let A be A1 , and let
each B n be obtained from the model Bkn from the proof of Proposition 10 by putting every
vertex into the extension of the predicate V . From that proof it is immediate that, for all
n A1 kn B n but A16 k Bn . For each i 2 Ai j= 9x:V x and, consequently, Ai 6 k Bn . This
establishes that each B n is not in C .
V
In order to show that C 62 Lk (9) we now de ne a single B 62 C such that for all
n, there is an Af (n) such that Af (n) kn B. By Proposition 14, this will establish that
V
+
C 62 Lk (9). Let R+ be an expansion of R obtained by letting V R = fag for some a 2 R
such that R j= Eaa. Let R; be an expansion of R obtained by letting V R = fag, for
some a 2 R such that R j= :Eaa. We say that an element a contains a loop, or is looped,
i Eaa. Otherwise, it is loop free. Likewise, we say that each R+ is looped and that R;
is loop free. We de ne B to be the disjoint union of k copies of both R+ and R; . A
component of B is any submodel that is one of the copies of R+ or R; . Observe that the
;
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components are exactly the maximal connected submodels. Here the predicate V plays a
role like the constants s and t in the proof of Proposition 16.
It is easy to see that B is not in C . For each i, Ai has the property, expressible in L3,
that there are two distinct vertices, both in the relation V , that are connected by a path
of length i. On the other hand, no component of B contains two distinct elements in V 
thus, for all i, Ai 6 k B .
Let f (x) = 2x+1 + 1. It remains to establish that, for each n Af (n) kn B: As in the
proof of Proposition 16, the Duplicator can win the n-move 9k -game on Af (n) and B
because the vertices of Af (n) that are in V are too far apart for the S to distinguish the
models by witnessing that they are actually connected. In order to describe the D's winning
strategy, we de ne an auxiliary matching partial function, (x m), that assigns to each
vertex x 2 Af (n) that is pebbled in round m a vertex a0 2 Af (n) such that Af (n) j= V a0.
We will write m (x) for (x m), or even omit the subscript when it is unnecessary. Let
aj 2 Af (n)bj 2 B] denote the vertex pebbled by the S D] in round j  let Rj denote the
component of B that contains bj . For all a 2 Af (n), say that a is live in round m i V a
or a is occupied by a pebble at the end of the round. The function m (x) will satisfy the
following conditions, for all a a0 2 fb j b is live in round mg:

1. If the S does not replay the pebble on a in round m, then m+1(a) = m (a).
2. For all m  n, if V a, then m (a) = a.
3. If a 6= a0 and m (a) 6= m (a0), then d(a a0) > 2n;(m+1). In particular, if m (a) 6=
m (a0), then there is no edge connecting a and a0 .

The D will also maintain the following `modularity' condition.

4. In each round m, if the pebbles on ai and aj  i < j have not been replayed between

rounds i and m, then m (ai ) = m (aj ) i bi and bj are on the same component of B .

In round 1 of the game, let the S play on a1 2 Af (n) . Let 1 (a1) be the element a0 2 V
that is closest to a1  observe that this is well-de ned and that d(a1 1(a1 ))  2n . Since the
distance between any two elements in V is greater than f (n) = 2n+1 , this implies that for
all v 2 V ; fag, d(a v ) > 2n , as required by condition 3. The D then chooses a component
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R1 of B such that R1 is looped i (a1 ) is looped let v1 be the unique element in R1 such
that V v1. She then plays on an element b1 2 R1 such that the 2-tuple (b1 v1) has the same
atomic type as (a1 (a1)), which immediately implies that the pebbles in play determine
a partial isomorphism. Since R1 j= ;k+1 , it is easy to see that there is such an element.
In round m + 1  n, the S plays on some am+1 . We describe the D's response by
considering two cases. One, for all a 6= am+1 that are live in round m + 1 d(a am+1)
2n;((m+1)+1) . In this case, let m+1 (am+1 ) be any v 2 V such that, for all live a 6=
v m(a) 6= v . The D now chooses an unpebbled component of B , which we call Rm+1,
that is looped i v is looped. Since there are k copies of each of R+ and R; , and only
k pebbles, there is always such a component. She then plays on some bm+1 2 Rm+1
such that the atomic type of (bm+1  vm+1) is the same as that of (am+1  (am+1 )), where
vm+1 is the unique element of Rm+1 such that V vm+1. Note that for all live, pebbled
aj  j  m m+1(aj ) 6= m+1 (am+1), which implies, by conditions 2 and 4 above, that
aj bj ] is not adjacent to am+1 bm+1]. Therefore the D has succeeded in preserving a partial

isomorphism it is easy to verify that conditions 1{4 are also maintained.
Second if there is an element a 2 fb j b is liveg such that d(a am+1)  2n;(m+2) , then
let m+1 (am+1 ) be m (a). In order to see that m+1 (am+1 ) is well-de ned, suppose that
there are two such elements, a and a0 . Observe that d(a a0)  d(a am+1) + d(am+1  a0) 
2n;(m+1) . By condition 3, we have that m (a) = m (a0), as desired. Note that m+1 (x)
satis es the above conditions 1{3. The D then plays on some element bm+1 2 Rm+1 such
that (bl1  : : : blj  bm+1 vm+1 ) has the same atomic type as (al1  : : : alj  am+1  m+1 (am+1 )),
where m+1 (ali ) = m+1 (am+1 ) and Rli = Rm+1 , for all i  j . Again, this is possible
because Rm+1 j= ;k+1 : Note that the D also maintains condition 4. This establishes that
the D has a winning strategy.
Finally, we prove the following separation.

Proposition 18 Over F , for k 3 Lk(9) (V Lk (9)) \ (W Lk (9)).
Proof. Let Path(x y ) express the binary query `there is an E -path from x to y .' For
signature  = fE sg, we de ne C = fA j 9x( Path(s x) and Path(x x))g. Let n (x y ) be
an L3 (9) formula that de nes the binary query `there is a path of length n from x to y .' It is
V
W
easy to see that C is in Lk (9). Also observe that ' = n2! 9x9y (s = x ^ n (x y )) de nes
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Finally, there are arbitrarily large minimal models in C , that is, models A 2 C such that
for all proper submodels B A B 62 C . This immediately implies that C 62 FO(9) and, a
fortiori, not in Lk (9).

C.
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Chapter 3

Existential preservation
3.1 Generalized preservation theorems
In this section, we prove some generalized preservation theorems for fragments of FO. Our
results are of the form
L \ EXT  L0
for certain quanti er pre x classes L
introduce the following notation.

FO, and L0 = L!1! (9) or Datalog(6= :). We

Denition 3 Let w be a regular expression over the alphabet f8 9g, in the sense of formal

language theory. FOw ], with square brackets, is the set of prenexed sentences ' such
that the quantier prex of ' is a word in the regular language determined by the regular
expression w. (For example, FO89] is the set of sentences whose quantier prex is a
single 8 followed by a string of 9's.)

Recall that Tait 23] showed FO \ EXT 6 FO(9). Gurevich and Shelah 14, 15] give
examples witnessing that
FO89 ] \ EXT 6 FO(9)
and Compton observed that
FO98 ] \ EXT  FO(9)
showing that these examples are best possible in terms of quanti er alternation pre x (see
14]). Kolaitis and Vardi (see 3]) observed that the example of Gurevich and Shelah 14]
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can be de ned in Datalog(6= :). Theorem 2 below establishes that
FO989] \ EXT  Datalog(6= :):
It follows that the above mentioned examples in the literature witnessing the failure of
the Los-Tarski theorem in the nite case are de nable in Datalog(6= :), since all these
examples are in FO989]. The next theorem establishes a slightly more general result
with L!1! (9) in place of Datalog(6= :).

Theorem 1 FO989] \ EXT  L!1! (9):
Proof. Let ' 2 FO989 ] \ EXT. That is, ' 2 FO989 ] and Modf (') 2 EXT. Let
C = Modf ('). We proceed to show that C 2 L!1! (9): By Proposition 8, it suces to show
that there is a k such that, for each A 2 C and B 62 C , there is a AB 2 Lk1! (9) such that
A j= AB and B 6j= AB .
Let ' = 9x1 : : :xi 8y 9z1 : : :zj (x y z), where is quanti er free, and let k = i + j + 1
(we suppose, without loss of generality, that i > 0). We now describe a winning strategy
for S in the eternal 9k -game on A and B , for A 2 C and B 62 C , which establishes, by
Proposition 6, the existence of AB 2 Lk1! (9) with the desired properties. There are two
stages. Let a = (a1 : : : ai) be a sequence of elements of A such that A j= 8y 9z (a y z).
If D has not lost after h rounds, for h < i, S plays pebble h+1 on element ah+1 . If
S has not won after i moves, and D has played her pebbles on b = (b1 : : : bi), then
B j= 9y 8z : (b y z) (since B 6j= ').
The goal of the second part of S's strategy is to force D to play a pebble on some
element b0 such that B j= 8z : (b b0 z), without removing any of the pebbles 1  : : : i
which ` x the interpretation' of the variables x1  : : : xi on both A and B . Regardless of
the element a0 on which S will have played his corresponding pebble, A j= 9z (a a0 z ), so
that he can then win easily. In order to describe S's strategy, we rst de ne a sequence of
subsets of the universe of B . Let ;0 = fb0 j b0 2 B and B j= 8z : (b b0 z)g. Observe that
B j= 9y 8z : (b y z ), and therefore ;0 is non-empty. Given ;0 : : : ;m, if (Slm ;l ) \b = ,
S
then let Bm+1 be the submodel of B whose universe is (B ; lm ;l ): Let ;m+1 = fb0 j
b0 2 Bm+1 and Bm+1 j= 8y: (b b0 y)g. For each Bm , since Bm  B, we have that
Bm j= 8x9y 8z : (x y z). In particular, Bm j= 9y 8z: (b y z) and thus, as above, ;m+1
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is non-empty. Since B is nite, there is some n such that ;n \ b 6= , and some element
bf 2 ;n \ b pebbled by f . Then B is partitioned into the sets ;0 : : : ;n;1  Bn . We also
have that A j= 9z (a af  z), and Bn j= 8z : (b bf  z ).
The Spoiler can win by executing a substrategy that compels D to play in sets ;m
of successively smaller index. Let c be a sequence of elements of length j such that,
A j= (a af  c). S plays his next j moves on this sequence, until D makes a losing move
or plays a pebble g onto an element in ;m , for m  n ; 1: We claim that one of these
two possibilities must occur. For suppose that D plays on a sequence d  Bn . Then
Bn j= : (b bf  d), and (x y z) witnesses that the function that takes a  af  c to b  bf  d
and preserves the denotations of constants is not a partial isomorphism.
Suppose that D has played some pebble g into some set ;m . By the same argument
as above, reusing pebbles fi+1  : : : k g ; fg g, S can either win or force D to play into
some ;m , for some m0 < m. Iterating this procedure, S can force D to play into ;0 , and
then win by using the same procedure one more time.
0

We remark the following two re nements of the foregoing theorem.
1. For each B 62 C , there is a number mB such that for all A 2 C , S wins the mB round 9k -game on A and B: (Here, mB is determined by the maximum number of
sets ; that get de ned on B , for any choice of D's rst i moves.) It follows easily
from Proposition 5 that this condition is equivalent to there being a B 2 Lk (9),
with quanti er rank  mB , such that for all A 2 C , A j= B , and B 6j= B . Then
0 = VB 62C B is equivalent to ' and is a single in nite conjunction of Lk (9) sentences.
We know by Proposition 16 that not all sentences of Lk1! (9) can be expressed in this
form. Indeed, it follows from Theorem 2 below that if ' 2 FO989] \ EXT then '
V
W
is equivalent to a formula in Lk (9) \ Lk (9) for some k:
2. Suppose that ' is an Lk sentence with quanti er type 89 , that is, no 8 occurs in '
in the scope of another quanti er. In this case, we can show, by a modi cation of the
proof of Theorem 1, that ' is equivalent to an Lk1! (9) sentence. This contrasts with
Proposition 19 below which establishes that for all k, there is a sentence 'k 2 L3 such
that Modf ('k ) 2 EXT but 'k is not equivalent over F to any sentence in Lk1! (9).

Theorem 2 FO989] \ EXT  Datalog(6= :):
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Proof. Let ' = 9x1 : : :xj 8y 9z (x y z ), with (x y z ) quanti er free. Let c = (c1 : : : cp)
be the sequence of constants in the signature of ' and let C = Modf ('): For a 2 A, we
say that a closes with parameters a i there is a sequence a0(= a) a1 : : : an such that for
all l < n, A j= (a al al+1) and there is an m  n such that A j= (a an am ). Note that
this is equivalent to there being an a0 such that there is a (a y z )-path from a to a0 , and
a (a y z )-cycle including a0 .

We claim that A j= ' i there is a j -tuple a such that every element of a  c closes
with parameters a. Suppose that A does not satisfy these conditions. We prove that
A j= 8x9y8z : (x y z )) where the latter sentence is equivalent to :'. Let a  A be a
sequence of length j . By hypothesis, there is an a0 2 a  c such that a0 does not close
with parameters a. Since A is nite, this implies that there is an m 0 and a sequence
a0 = a00 : : : a0m such that for all l < m, A j= (a a0l a0l+1) and A j= 8z: (a a0m  z ), as
desired.
In the other direction, let a be such that every member of a  c closes with parameters
a. Let sh = hah0(= ah) : : : ahmh i and th = heh0 (= ch ) : : : ehnh i be sequences witnessing
that each element of a  c closes with parameters a. Let B be the submodel of A with
S S
universe i si  j tj . Then it is easy to verify that B j= ' and, since Modf (') 2 EXT, it
follows that A j= ':
The following program, with x = (x1  : : : xj ), computes ':

P (x y z) ; (x y z)
P (x y z) ; P (x y w) P (x w z )
Q ; P (x x1 y1) P (x y1 y1 ) : : : P (x xj  yj ) P (x yj  yj )
P (x c1 w1) P (x w1 w1) : : : P (x cp wp) P (x wp wp)

W

This can be easily converted into a Datalog(6= :) program. Let (x y z ) = i i , where
each i is a conjunction of literals. Replace the clause P (x y z ) ; (x y z ) with the
clauses P (x y z ) ; i , for all i.
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3.2 The failure of existential preservation for L!1!
In this section we prove that L!1! \ EXT 6 L!1! (9): Indeed, we establish that there is a
sentence  2 L!1! such that Mod() is closed under extensions, but there is no 2 L!1! (9)
such that Modf () = Modf ( ): Thus,  witnesses the failure of existential preservation for
L!1! simultaneously over the class of nite structures and over the class of all structures.
The central lemma on which this result relies is of interest in itself. It says that for all
k 3 the nitary language Lk fails in a strong way to satisfy an existential preservation
property. Andreka, van Benthem, and Nemeti 4] showed that for every k 3 there is a
sentence 'k 2 Lk which is preserved under extensions, but which is not equivalent to any
sentence of Lk (9). For k 3 the sentence 'k they construct uses a relation symbol of
arity k ; 1 and has the property that it is equivalent to a sentence of Lk+1 (9): They state
the following open problems.


For any k 3 and n 2 ! is there a sentence 'n 2 Lk which is preserved under
extensions, but which is not equivalent to any sentence of Lk+n (9)?



For k > 3 is there a formula of Lk containing only (one) binary relation symbols
which is preserved under extensions, but is not equivalent to any sentence of Lk (9)?

The next proposition settles both these open problems. The main result of the section
follows easily from the proof of this proposition.

Proposition 19 For each k < !, there is a sentence k 2 L3, containing a single binary
relation, such that

1. Mod(k ) is closed under extensions, but
2. Modf (k ) 6= Modf (') for all ' 2 Lk (9):
Proof. Before presenting the full proof, we sketch the basic outline. Let the k-pyramid of
B , P k (B), be the smallest class of ( nite and in nite) models containing B that is closed
under substructures and Lk -equivalence. For each k 3, we de ne nite structures Ak
and Bk with the following properties:

1. Ak k1! Bk 
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2.

P 3(Bk ) is L3 -de

nable

3. Ak 62 P 3(Bk ).
Let 'k 2 L3 be such that Mod('k ) = P 3(Bk ), and let k = :'k . It is obvious that
Mod(k ) is closed under extensions, that Ak j= k , and that Bk 6j= k . Suppose ' 2 Lk (9)
is such that Ak j= '. Since Ak k1! Bk , this implies that Bk j= ', and therefore that ' is
not equivalent to k .
We de ne structures Ak and Bk in terms of simpler submodels. For f  t, let the
t f ]- ag, F t f ], be the directed chain of length t with one additional vertex attached
to the f th link. That is, the vertex set of F t f ] is f0 1 : : : t t + 1g, and the edge
relation is f(i i + 1) j i < tg  f(f t + 1)g. Ak is the disjoint union of the k + 1 ags|
F 2k +2 k +1] F 2k +2 k +2] : : : F 2k +2 2k +1]. Let the k j ]-tree, T k j ], be the tree
obtained from Ak by fusing the ith nodes of each ag, for all i  j . This tree has height
2k + 2 and the node at height j has outdegree k + 1. Then Bk is the disjoint union of the
k trees| T k 0] T k 1] : : : T k k ; 1].
First we show that Ak k1! Bk by describing a winning strategy for D in the eternal 9k game on Ak and Bk . A component of a model is a maximal connected submodel. Observe
that every component of Ak is embeddable in every component of Bk . Call a component
of either Ak or Bk vacant at round n if there is no pebble located on any element of that
component before the players make their nth moves. We consider two cases of moves for
S. First, suppose that in some round n, S plays pebble i on a vacant component An of
Ak . Since there are only k pairs of pebbles, and since pebble i is not on the board, there
is a vacant component B n of Bk , and an isomorphic injection hn : An 7! B n . D will play
pebble i on hn (i ). In the other case, S plays on a non-vacant component An . There
is some m < n such that An has been occupied continuously since round m and either
m = 1 or An was vacant at round m ; 1: Thus An = Am , and there are previously de ned
Bm and hm . D now plays i on hm (i). By this condition, every pair of pebbles (l l)
on components Am and B m satis es the condition that hm (l ) = l . In both cases, it
is clear that D has maintained a partial isomorphism. By Proposition 6, it now follows
immediately that Ak k1! Bk .
Next, we show that P 3(Bk ) is de nable in L3 . Consider the following properties:
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1. A contains no chains of length

2k + 2.

2. A contains no cycles of length  2k + 2.
3. No element a 2 A has indegree

2 that is, A j= :9x9y 9z (x 6= y ^ Exz ^ Eyz ):

It is easy to show that each property is expressible in L3, is closed under substructures,
and holds of Bk . From this it follows immediately that each B 0 2 P 3(Bk ) possesses all
three properties. Consequently, every member of P 3(Bk ) is a forest consisting of directed
trees of height  2k + 2.
Next we note the following facts:

Lemma 2 Let A and B be the disjoint unions of components A1 : : : Am and B1 : : : Bn,

respectively. For k 3, A k1! B if and only if for each component Ai Bi ], either the
number of components of A that are Lk -equivalent to it is equal to the number of components
of B that are Lk -equivalent to it or both numbers are k.

This result can be proved by a simple pebble game argument.

Lemma 3 For each h, and each k 3, up to equivalence in Lk there are only nitely
many trees of height  h.

The proof proceeds by induction on h. The case where h = 1 is obvious. Given a tree T ,
call a proper subtree that contains a node t of height 1 and all of its descendents a 1-tree
of T . For h > 1, we claim that two trees T1 and T2 of height at most h are Lk -equivalent
if and only if for each 1-tree T 0 Ti , the number of 1-trees of T1 that are Lk -equivalent to
T 0 equals the number of 1-trees of T2 that are Lk -equivalent to T 0 , or both numbers are
k. The argument is just like the proof of the preceding lemma. From the claim, the
lemma follows immediately.

Corollary 3 For each h, and each k 3, up to equivalence in Lk there are only nitely

many forests of height  h.

This is an immediate consequence of the preceding lemmas.
These observations establish that there are only nitely many complete Lk -theories that
are satis able in P 3(Bk ). Moreover, each such theory has a nite model. By 9], every
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such theory is axiomatized by a single Lk sentence. Hence, if we let 'k be the disjunction
of these sentences, we have Mod('k ) = P 3(Bk ) as desired.
Finally, we argue that Ak 62 P 3(Bk ). By the de nition of P 3 (Bk ) for every B 0 2
P 3(Bk ) there is an m 2 ! and a sequence (E0 D1 E1 : : : Dm Em) of structures, with
Bk = E0 and B 0 = Em , such that:
1. For all 1  i  m Di  Ei;1 :
2. For all 1  i  m, Di

3

Ei .

It suces to show that for any such sequence, Ak cannot be embedded in any Ei. Let
g : P 3(Bk ) 7! f0 1 : : : k + 1g be the function such that g (D) is the maximum number
of components of Ak that can be embedded in D pairwise disjointly. We show that for
each i  m g (Ei) < k + 1. In fact, we show that g is monotonically decreasing on
the aforementioned sequence. Because each Di is a submodel of Ei;1 , it is clear that
g(Di)  g (Ei;1). It remains to establish that g (Bk ) < k + 1 and that g(Ei)  g (Di).
Observe that any embedding of a ag F 2k + 2 f ] into a component C of any B 0 2
P 3(Bk ) must map the root of the ag to the root of C . This implies that no two ags of Ak
can be disjointly embedded into any such component and, since Bk has only k components,
that g (Bk ) < k + 1.
From Lemma 2, it follows that every Ei can be obtained from Di by repeated application
of the following three operations. First, replace some component with a component that
is L3-equivalent to it. Second, add a disjoint copy of a tree that is L3-equivalent to
at least 3 components. Third, remove a component that is L3 -equivalent to at least 3
other components. Thus, it suces to argue that no such operation performed on some
B 0 2 P 3(Bk ) can yield a B 00 such that g (B00) > g(B 0). It is obvious that removing a
component cannot increase the value of g .
We claim that it suces to consider the e ect of the other two operations on components
of height = 2k + 2. If trees T and T 0 are L3-equivalent, then they have the same height.
Also, no component F 2k + 2 f ] of Ak can be embedded in any tree of height < 2k + 2.
This establishes that the presence of shorter components in a model B does not a ect the
value of g (B ):
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Observe that for all trees T and T 0 such that T 3 T 0, F t f ] can be embedded in T i
it can be embedded in T 0. This is because the following property can be expressed in L3:
there is an element x such that (i) there is a y such that there is a path of length f from
y to x (ii) x has outdegree 2 (iii) there is a y such that there is a path of length t ; f
from x to y . Over trees, this property says that the model embeds F t f ]. Consequently
the operation of replacement cannot increase the value of g .
It remains to establish that adding an additional component to a model B 0 2 P 3(Bk )
does not change the value of g . We observe that Bk has the following properties:
1. For each (2k + 2)-chain contained in Bk there is at most one j 0  j  k ; 1, such
that the j th link of the chain has outdegree > 1:
2. For each (2k + 2)-chain contained in Bk there is at most one j k + 1  j  2k + 1,
such that the j th link of the chain has outdegree > 1:
These properties are closed under substructures and L3 -equivalence consequently, they
hold of every model B 0 2 P 3(Bk ). Let C1  C2 and C3 be L3-equivalent components of B 0
of height 2k +2. The above argument establishes that each Ci is either some F 2k +2 f ], or
the simple (2k + 2)-chain. Let B 00 be the extension of B 0 obtained by adding a component
C4. Observe that, in fact, all four components must be isomorphic, and embed at most
one isomorphism type of ag. Therefore, the image of any embedding h : Ak 7! B 00
can contain vertices from at most one of these four components. This demonstrates that
g(B0) = g(B 00), and completes the proof.
The following result establishes the failure of existential preservation for L!1! .

Theorem 3 There is a sentence  2 L!1! such that both
1. Mod() is closed under extensions.
2. For all ' 2 L!1! (9) Modf () 6= Modf ('):
Proof. We claim that it suces to show that for each k 2 ! there is a sentence k 2 L3
and a pair of nite models Ak and Bk such that

1. Mod(k ) is closed under extensions.
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2. Ak j= k and Bk 6j= k .
3. Ak k1! Bk .
4. For all j Aj j= k .

V

Let  = k k . It is clear that  is closed under extensions and that it has nite models, since
it is true in each Ak . Suppose that ' is a sentence in Lk1! (9) such that  implies '. Then
Ak j= ', and therefore Bk j= '. But for all l, Bl 6j= . Therefore, Modf () 6= Modf ('):
The sentences k and the models Ak and Bk from the proof of Proposition 19 fail to
meet condition 4 because for j < k, Aj 6j= k . To see this, observe that Aj will always be a
submodel of Bk . To x this defect, it suces to construct A0k  Bk0  and k0 as in the proof of
Proposition 19 that also satisfy the additional condition that, for all j and k, A0j 62 P 3(Bk0 ).
In order to accomplish this, we add simple `gadgets' to the models. Let the k-cycle, Ck ,
be the graph on k vertices whose edge relation forms a simple, directed cycle of length k.
Then let A0k and Bk0 be obtained from Ak and Bk , respectively, by adding a disjoint copy of
Ck . By slightly modifying the proof of Proposition 19, we can show that A0k k1! Bk0 , and
that there is a k0 2 L3 satis ed by exactly the models in the complement of P 3(Bk0 ) such
that A0k j= k0 . Finally, it is easy to verify that for j 6= k, the j -cycle cannot be embedded
in any B 2 P 3(Bk0 ) and, therefore, A0j j= k0 .
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Chapter 4

Other (generalized) preservation
theorems
In previous chapters, we investigated `existential logics' and de nability over the class EXT
of sets of structures closed under extensions. We now turn our attention to some other
natural classes of structures and examine the status of (generalized) preservation theorems
in connection with these classes. Recall that a homomorphism h(x) from A to B is a
function from A to B such that for all n-ary relation symbols R(x) in the signature of
A, and all n-tuples a in An, if A j= R(a), then B j= R(h(a)). Let HOM be the class
consisting of all sets of nite models that are closed under homomorphisms. A model B
is an enrichment of A over the relations R1 : : : Rt i the universe of B is equal to the
universe of A, and for all n-ary relations Ri (x) i  t, and all n-tuples a 2 An = B n ],
if A j= Ri(a), then B j= Ri (a). A class C of models is monotone in relations R1 : : :Rt
i for all A 2 C , if B is an enrichment of A over the relations R1  : : : Rt, then B 2 C .
Below we will be interested in sets of structures that are monotone in every relation of
their signature. Let MON denote the class of such sets of nite models.
Preservation theorems from classical model theory provide exact characterizations of
the FO-de nable classes that are closed under homomorphisms and that are monotone.
The Homomorphism preservation theorem says that a FO-de nable class is closed under
homomorphisms i it is de ned by a (purely) positive existential sentence, i.e. an existential
sentence in which every relation symbol, and equality, occurs only positively. Lyndon's
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lemma states that a FO-de nable class of models is monotone in relations R = fR1 : : : Rk g
i it is de ned by a sentence  in which each relation in R occurs only positively, i.e. in the
scope of no negations. It is still an open problem whether the Homomorphism preservation
theorem fails over F . We discuss this question in depth in Section 1, in which we present
some partial positive results. Ajtai and Gurevich 2] showed that Lyndon's lemma fails
over the class of nite models. More recently, Stolboushkin 22] has constructed a simpler
counterexample. Below, we give a slight simpli cation of Stolboushkin's example that is
also monotone in every relation symbol. This result, and generalized preservation theorems
over HOM and MON, are discussed in Section 2.

4.1 The class HOM
We investigate the status of preservation theorems over the class HOM. Although it is
unknown whether the Homomorphism preservation theorem remains true over F , below
we present some partial positive results, answering the question for certain fragments of FO.
In particular, we show that every sentence in FO89 8 ] \ HOM is equivalent to a positive
existential sentence. In contrast to earlier results for EXT, we resolve (armatively)
the homomorphism preservation theorem only for the nite variable language L2 . We then
discuss the class IHOM of sets closed under injective homomorphisms. Finally, we establish
a preservation theorem for identity free FO sentences over F .
We introduce the following notation. Let FO(+ 6=) denote the fragment of FO containing exactly those sentences in which no relation symbol occcurs in the scope of a
negation. Thus, the negation symbol may only bind equalities. We use FO(9 +) to
denote the purely positive existential fragment of FO. Adding inequalities to this fragment, we get FO(9 + 6=). In this terminology, the major open problem is whether
FO \ HOM = FO(9 +).

4.1.1 The homomorphism preservation property for FO
In this section, we consider various fragments of FO. We rst show that if ' 2 FO \ HOM is
either existential or positive, then it is equivalent to a positive existential sentence. Recall
that A is a minimal model of a class C i for all proper submodels B of A B 62 C : Also, the
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positive diagram of a model A of cardinality n is the conjunction of all atomic formulas with
free variables among fx1 : : : xn g that are true in A under some xed injective assignment
of these variables onto the universe of A. The next lemma is straightforward.

Lemma 4 Let ' be an existential FO sentence such that Modf (') is closed under homomorphisms. Then there is a  2 FO(9 +) that is equivalent to '.

Proof. Let C = Modf ('). Since C is in FO(9), it has nitely many minimal models. Let
 be the disjunction of the existential closures of the positive diagrams of each minimal
model in C . It is easy to verify the equivalence of  and '.

Below we establish the complementary result for the positive fragment of FO. Our
proof requires the following Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game, played on a single structure. Unlike
games played on two structures, in each round only one player makes a move.

Denition 4 Let ' be a prenexed FO sentence, ' = Q1x1 : : :Qnxn (x1 : : : xn), where

each Qi is a quantier and is quantier free. The '-game is played as follows. In each
round m 1  m  n , the D plays if Qm is an 9 otherwise, the S plays. As usual, a move
consists of placing a pebble, m , on some element of A. After n rounds, the D wins if
A j= 1 : : :n ], and the S wins otherwise.

The following proposition characterizes satisfaction of a sentence in a model game
theoretically.

Proposition 20 For all prenexed sentences, ', and all structures A A j= ' i the D has
a winning strategy in the '-game.

Proposition 21 For all satisable sentences ' ' 2 FO(+ 6=) \ HOM i there is an equivalent  2 FO(9 +): If ' is unsatisable, and thus in HOM, then it is equivalent to the
existential sentence 9x(x 6= x):]

Proof. Let ' be satis able and in FO(+ 6=) \ HOM. Let C = Modf ('). If ' is valid, we let
 be 9x(x = x). Otherwise, by Corollary 6, proved below, we can assume that ' is identity
free, i.e. contains no equalities or inequalities. Furthermore, we can also assume that ' has
been prenexed and that its matrix is in conjunctive normal form, i.e. is a conjunction of
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disjunctions of atomic formulas. We say that an atomic formula, Rx, is a 8-formula of ' i
there is a variable x0 2 x that is bound by a universal quanti er in '. Let  be the sentence
obtained from ' by deleting all occurences of all 8-formulas and all universal quanti ers.
For example, if ' were 9x1 8x2 9x3 ((Rx1x2 _ Px1 _ Px3 ) ^ (Rx1x3 _ Rx2 x3 _ Px2 )), then
 would be 9x19x3 ((Px1 _ Px3) ^ (Rx1x3)). We claim that  is equivalent to '. (Observe
that  is obtained e ectively from an identity free '.)
First we show that every conjunct of ' contains a non-8-formula. Suppose, for contradiction, that  is a conjunct of ' that contains only 8-formulas. Let A be any model in C ,
and let A0 be the extension of A obtained by adding one element, a0 , without altering any of
the relations. Observe that A0 is in C , since the class is closed under homomorphisms. We
claim that the S has a winning strategy in the '-game on A0 , which implies that A0 6j= ', a
contradiction. In order to win, it suces for the S to always play each of his moves on the
element a0 , regardless of the D's play. Every variable assignment extending the assignment
determined by S's moves falsi es the conjunct  , and hence also the formula '. Therefore
the S wins the '-game, as desired.
V
We now show that  implies '. Let ' = Q1x1 : : :Qn xn 1j k j , where each j is a
V
disjunction of atomic formulas. Let  = Qs1 xs1 : : :Qsm xsm 1j k j , where each Qsl is
9, and each j is obtained from j by deleting all 8-formulas. Suppose that A j=  let
a = (as1  : : : asm )  A be such that A j= V1jk j a]. We now describe the D's winning
strategy in the '-game on A. In each round sl  n, she plays a pebble on asl . Any variable
assignment for fx1 : : :xm g that is determined by such a game veri es each j , hence also
each j . Therefore A j= ', thereby establishing that  implies '.
Next we prove the opposite direction. Let A j= ' and, again, let A0 be the extension of
A obtained by adding an `isolated' element, a0. Since A0 j= ', the D has a winning strategy
for the '-game on A0 . In particular, she can win a game in which the S plays every one
of his pebbles on a0. Since a0 is not a member of any tuple that is in any relation, RA ,
and since every atomic formula occurs only positively, we can assume that the D does not
play any pebble on a0. Let a = (as1  : : : asm )  A be some tuple in A  A0 such that
the D wins the '-game on A0 in which the S always plays on a0 and, in each round sl ,
the D plays on asl . Observe that each 8-formula is falsi ed by this variable assignment.
Therefore each disjunction, j , must contain a non-8-formula, j , that is satis ed by this
0
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variable assignment in A0 . Since each j occurs in the disjunction j , it is easy to see that
A j= V1j k j a]. Therefore, A j= . This establishes that ' implies , and completes the
proof.
Next, we establish another partial positive result over a fragment of FO, de ned in
terms of quanti er pre x structure. The proof uses the following version of the EhrenfeuchtFraisse game. The 8l 9m 8n -game on A and B is a 3-round game played with l + m + n
labeled pebble pairs such that:
1. The Spoiler plays l pebbles, 1 = ( 1 : : : l), on B . The Duplicator then puts l
pebbles, 1 = (1 : : : l), on A.
2. In round 2, the S plays m pebbles 2 = (l+1  : : : l+m ) on A. The D then puts m
pebbles, 2 = ( l+1 : : : l+m), on B .
3. In round 3, the S plays n pebbles, 3 = ( l+m+1  : : : l+m+n ) on B . The D then
puts n pebbles, 3 = (l+m+1  : : : l+m+n ), on A.
Of course, the D wins just in case the pebbles determine a partial isomorphism from A to
B . The following lemma is easy to verify.

Lemma 5 The following two conditions are equivalent.
1. For all ' 2 FO8l 9m 8n ], if A j= ', then B j= '.
2. The D has a winning strategy in the 8l 9m 8n -game on A and B .

Proposition 22 FO898] \ HOM = FO(9 +). Furthermore, given ' 2 FO898] \

HOM, there is an e ective procedure for nding an equivalent sentence  2 FO(9 +).

Proof. Let ' be in FO8l9m 8n ] \ HOM, and let  be the signature of '. We show that there
is an s 2 ! that bounds the size of every minimal model of C = Modf ('). This implies
that C is de ned by a sentence in FO(9) and thus, by Lemma 4, that it is actually de nable
in FO(9 +). In fact, we can calculate s as a function of m and  , which establishes that
there is an e ective procedure for nding a sentence equivalent to ' in FO(9 +). Let r
be the number of models, up to isomorphism, of signature  and cardinality m, and let
s = r  m: Also let t = l + m + n.
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Let A be a minimal model of C . We want to show that there is a B 2 C , of cardinality
 s, such that there is a homomorphism from B into A. By the minimality of A, the homomorphism must be onto, implying that the cardinality of A is also  s: Let fM1 : : : Mq g
be the set of submodels of A of cardinality = m, again up to isomorphism. We use C  D
to denote the model which is the disjoint union of C and D, and p  D to denote the disjoint
union of p copies of D. Let G = (t  M1)      (t  Mq ) and let B = M1      Mq : It is
obvious that there are homomorphisms from G onto B , and from B into A. Observe also
that the cardinality of B is q  m  s. Since C is closed under homomorphisms, it suces
to show that G 2 C .
To establish this fact, we de ne an extension A0 of A, and describe the D's winning
strategy for the 8l 9m 8n -game on A0 and G. Since A0 j= ', this implies that G j= '. Let
A0 = A  G and let f (x) be the obvious injection from G into A0 . In Round 1, the S
plays l pebbles, 1 , on some l-tuple in G: The D then plays on the l-tuple f ( 1), in A0 . In
Round 2, the S plays some pebbles, 20, on A  A0, and plays his other pebbles, 21, on
G  A0. Conceptually, the D makes her move in two stages. She rst plays her pebbles,
2 1
, on f ;1 (21 ). She then chooses an unpebbled component Mp0 of G, one of the copies
of Mp , such that there is an embedding, h(x), from Mp0 into G that contains the tuple 20
in its range. There must be such a component since G contains t copies of each Mp . The
D then plays her pebbles, 20, on the preimage of 20 under h(x). It is clear that the
D succeeds in maintaining a partial isomorphism. Now, let f 0 (x) be the embedding of G
into A0 that equals h(x) on Mp0 , and equals f (x) on G ; Mp0 . In Round 3, the D plays her
pebbles, 3, on the image, f 0( 3 )  A0, of the pebbles played by the S. It is easy to see
that this is indeed a winning strategy for the D.

4.1.2 L2 has the homomorphism preservation property
In this section, we show that L2 has the homomorphism preservation property over F
and over the class of all structures. That is, we show that L2 \ HOM = L2 (9 +), where
L2(9 +) is the set of sentences in L2 \ FO(9 +). Recall that it is unknown whether L2 has
the existential preservation property, though the corresponding negative result has been
established for all Lk  k 3 (see 4]). As L2 only contains two variables, we assume, without
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loss of generality, that the signature,  , does not contain any relation of arity 3: Elements
a and b are adjacent i there is a binary relation Rxy 2  such that A j= Rab _ Rba:

Proposition 23 The homomorphism preservation theorem holds for L2 over F and over
the class of all structures. In fact, for all ' 2 L2 \ HOM, an equivalent  2 L2 (9 +) such
that qr()  qr(') can be found e ectively.

Proof. Let ' 2 L2 \ HOM, and let qr(') = n. Let C = Modf ('). (The same argument also
establishes the claim in the in nite case.) For each model A 2 C , we de ne a sentence A 2
L2(9 +), with qr(A)  n, such that A j= A and Modf (A)  C : From the construction,
it will be clear that, although C is in nite, there are only nitely many distinct A . Letting
 = WA2C A , it is immediate that Modf () = Modf (').
For each model A, and elements a b 2 A, let ab(x y ) be the atomic type of (a b) in
A, i.e. the conjunction of all atomic formulas , with free variables among x y , such that
A j= a b]. For all a 2 A, and all m  n, we also de ne a formula am(x) 2 L2(9 +),
with qr( am(x))  m, such that A j= am a]. Let N (a), the neighbors of a, denote the set of
b 6= a such that a is adjacent to b. a0(x) is just the atomic type of a in A. For all m + 1,
V
we essentially want am+1 (x) to be am (x) ^ b2N (a) 9y (ab(x y ) ^ am (y )), except that we
eliminate redundant, identical conjuncts. (Here, am (y ) denotes the formula obtained from
m
a (x) by exchanging all occurences of x and y .) This guarantees that, for xed m, there
V
are only nitely many formulas of the form am (x). Finally, let A = a2A 9x an;1 (x),
again eliminating redundant conjuncts.
To show that A implies ', we de ne a model M such that (i)M j= A  (ii)M 2 C  (iii)
for all B such that B j= A , there is a homomorphism from M to B . Since C is closed
under homomorphisms, these conditions imply that every model of A is in C , as desired.
Given A , let Q = fq1 : : : qtg be the set of occurences of (existential) quanti ers in A . For
de niteness, we stipulate that if i < j , then qi occurs to the left of qj in A . The universe
of M is Q. The interpretation of the relations on M is determined straightforwardly from
A , as follows. M j= Eqi qj i there is an occurence of an atomic formula, Evw, such that
`v ' and `w' are bound by qi and qj , respectively. Similarly for unary predicates. Every
formula occcurs only positively, so M is well-de ned. It is easy to see that M satis es
conditions (i) and (iii). Indeed, for all B , an assignment of variables that veri es that
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B j= A determines a homomorphism from M to B.
To prove that M 2 C , it suces to show that there are A0 and N such that (i)A 
A0 (ii)A0 2n N and (iii) there is a homomorphism from N to M . Here, A0 2n N
means that for all 2 L2 with qr( )  n A0 j= i N j= . Since C is closed under
homomorphisms and L2n -equivalence, (i) ; (iii) imply that M 2 C . Let N = 2  M and
A0 = A  N . It is immediate that (i) and (iii) are satis ed.
We de ne the following supplementary relation on M , and hence also on N . For all
qi  qj 2 M Sqiqj i qj occurs in the scope of qi and there is an occurence of a binary atomic
formula in A that contains variables bound by both qi and qj . Observe that qi and qj in
Q are adjacent in M i they are adjacent in the model (Q S ). We claim that (Q S ) is
a directed forest, i.e. the disjoint union of directed trees. (Alternatively, G is a directed
forest i it is acylic and every element a has indegree  1:) The acylicity of (Q S ) follows
immediately from the de nition of Sxy . To establish the claim, it suces to prove the
following lemma.

Lemma 6 Let be a formula of L2, and let qj be an occurence of a quantier in . Then

there is at most one quantier occurence, qi , such that (i) qj is in the scope of qi , and (ii)
there is an atomic formula, Evw, in such that `v ' and `w' are bound by both qi and qj .

Proof. Let qj occur in , and let qj x( (x)) be a subformula of , such that the scope of qj
is  (x). Every occurence of a binary relation symbol that contains two distinct variables,
contains the two variables, x and y , since 2 L2 . Suppose that qi satsi es conditions (i)
and (ii) of the lemma. Then qi must bind every free occurence of the variable y in the
subformula  (x). Therefore no other quanti er in can satisfy this pair of conditions.

Since (Q S ) is a forest, there is a well-de ned function,  (x), on M N ], such that  (qi )
is the height of qi in (Q S ). The height of the model M N ] equals qr(A ) ; 1  n ; 1:
We now establish that A0 2n N by describing the D's winning strategy in the n-round
2-pebble game on A0 and N . We claim that if the S can win the game, then he can do so
playing according to the following `normal form'.
1. In each round m + 1, he plays the pebble pair that was not played in the previous
round, and does not replay it on the same element it just occupied.
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2. In round 1, he plays a pebble i on the A-component of A0 .
3. In each round m + 1, he plays a pebble i  i ] on an element adjacent to 1;i  1;i ].
Condition 1 is obvious. To see that 2 does not hinder the S, suppose that he does not
play his rst move on the A-component of A0 . The D will then play all of her moves
according to the bijection between N and the N -component of A0, until the S plays on
the A-component. To win, the S must eventually play some i on the A-component. The
D will then play i on the vacant M -component of N . At the start of the next round,
pebbles j and j  i 6= j are removed from the board so the S could have reached the same
position sooner by playing on A 2 A0 in round 1.
Consider Condition 3. Suppose that in some round m +1, the S plays i on an element
of N not adjacent to 1;i . The D then plays i on the corresponding element of a vacant
M -component in A0: Since the pebbles j  j  i 6= j will be replayed in the next round, for
the same reasons as above the S has not made any progress. Likewise, if the S plays on
A0, again the D can respond by playing on the vacant M -component of N .
We now describe the D's winning strategy assuming that the S always plays in accord
with the above conditions. The S begins by playing on some a 2 A  A0 . The D then plays
on the qk (of either M -component) such that qk occurs in the formula A as the quantifer
that binds the formula an;1 (x). Observe that qk is the root of an S -tree. In all later rounds,
the pebbles are always played adjacently, so the D can play so that these pebbles `climb
up the S -tree'. To win, she maintains the condition that the pebbles, i , i , are played
in round m so that  ( i ) = m ; 1 and i is located on the element ql that binds the
formula j i (x y ) ^ n;i m (y ). Suppose that the D has maintained this condition through
m rounds, m < n, and that, in round m + 1, the S plays j 2 N (i). The D will then play
pebble j on the quanti er occurence that binds the formula i j (x y ) ^ n;j (m+1) (y ),
which is a conjunct of n;i m (y ). The argument for the case where the S plays on N is
similar. Because the D always plays `up the tree', in every round m > 2, the pebble of
lesser height will be replayed. The S is thereby prevented from moving down the tree, as
doing so would violate Condition 1. This establishes that A0 2n N . Thus, A implies ',
W
and  = A A is equivalent to '.
0

0
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Lastly, we argue that  can be found e ectively. By induction on m, it is easy to show
that one can e ectively generate all possible formulas of the form am(x). Thus one can
also enumerate the ( nite) set, ", of formulas of the form A , with qr(A )  n, for xed
n. Let d be the maximal number of quanti ers occuring in any formula i 2 ": Every
minimal model of Modf (i ) has cardinality  d, so ' is equivalent to i i the sentences
are equivalent on all models of cardinality  d, which is decidable. Since " is nite, one
can e ectively nd the  2 " that is equivalent to '.

4.1.3 Injective homomorphisms
In this section, we briey discuss a class that lies between EXT and HOM. Recall that a
map h(x) is injective i for all a b 2 dom(h), if f (a) = f (b), then a = b. Let IHOM be
the class consisting of exactly those sets of nite models which are closed under injective
homomorphisms. Observe that HOM  IHOM  EXT and that each inclusion is proper.
Over the class of all structures, the Injective homomorphism theorem says that a FOde nable class of models is closed under injective homomorphisms i it is de nable by a
FO(9 + 6=) sentence. Minor modi cations of the proofs of Proposition 19 and Theorem 3
yield the following results.

Proposition 24 For each k < !, there is a sentence k 2 L3, containing a single binary
relation, such that

1. Mod(k ) is closed under injective homomorphisms, but
2. Modf (k ) 6= Modf (') for all ' 2 Lk (9):
(Sketch) Alter the proof of Proposition 19 by de ning the k ; pyramid of B P k (B ), to
be the smallest class of ( nite and in nite) models containing B that is closed under
substructures, Lk -equivalence, and impoverishments. (A is an impoverishment of B i B
is an enrichment of A.) The proof then proceeds as before.

The next theorem follows from the previous proposition as Theorem 3 follows from
Proposition 19.

Theorem 4 There is a sentence  2 L!1! such that both
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1. Mod() is closed under injective homomorphisms.
2. For all ' 2 L!1! (9) Modf () 6= Modf ('):

Beyond these two propositions, other results relating to preservation properties for
EXT and HOM do not seem to generalize easily to yield analagous results for IHOM. For
example, we do not see how to adapt any of the examples witnessing the failure of the
Existential preservation theorem, due to Tait, Gurevich-Shelah, and Grohe, to de ne nontrivial FO-classes in IHOM. Furthermore, our proofs of partial positive results concerning
FO-de nability over HOM appear to rely essentially on the stronger closure properties of
HOM. There are thus various open questions regarding injective homomorphism preservation properties over F . We pose the following problem.


Does the Injective homomorphism preservation theorem hold over F ?

By Lemma 4, an armative answer to this question immediately implies the Homomorphism preservation theorem over F , though it is uncertain whether the reverse implication
holds.
This brief section indicates that the class IHOM is rather di erent than EXT and
HOM, while still sharing features with both classes. Resolving the status of the Injective
homomorphism preservation theorem in either way would yield additional information
about older questions and results. Thus, a negative answer would clearly strengthen Tait's
result. More generally, we believe that further understanding of the relationship between
de nability over EXT, IHOM, and HOM will provide insight into FO-de nability and
(generalized) preservation properties.

4.1.4 Identity free FO
The following preservation theorem characterizes the expressive power gained from adding
the identity sign to the language of FO. As the proof uses a modi ed Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse
game, it is simultaneously a proof over F and over the class of all structures. A map
h(x) from A to B is a strict surjection i it is a homomorphism of A onto B such that
for all k-ary relations, R(x), in the signature of A, and all k-tuples a  A, A j= R(a) i
B j= R(h(a)): A class C is closed under reverse strict surjections i for all A, and all B 2 C ,
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if there is a strict surjection from A to B , then A 2 C . For the rest of this section, to avoid
trivialities, we restrict our attention to languages with non-empty signatures.

Denition 5 The n-round (`identity free') i.f.-game on A and B is played according to

the same rules as the standard n-round Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game on A and B , but has
di erent winning conditions. The S wins at some round m i there is a k-ary relation
symbol, R(x), and a sequence, p = (p1 : : : pk ), pi  m, such that A j= R(p1  : : : pk ) i
B 6j= R( p1  : : : pk ): The D wins the game if the S does not win at any round m  n.

Observe that the D does not have to play so that the pebbles determine a bijection between
the models. This reects the absence of identity in the language under consideration. We
omit the obvious equivalent algebraic characterization. The following proposition and
corollary are stated without proof.

Proposition 25 Given models A and B, the following two conditions are equivalent.
1. For all identity free sentences, ', with quantier rank  n A j= ' i B j= '.
2. The D has a winning strategy in the n-round i.f.-game on A and B .

Corollary 4 For all classes C, the following two conditions are equivalent.
1. C is dened by an identity free sentence of quantifer rank  n.
2. For all A 2 C  B 62 C , the S wins the n-round i.f.-game on A and B .

We now state and prove the preservation theorem.

Proposition 26 Let C be a class of models. Then C is FO-denable and closed under strict
surjections and reverse strict surjections i it is denable by an identity free sentence.

Proof. Let C be de ned by a sentence ' 2 FO, with qr(') = n. We argue that for all
A 2 C  B 62 C, the S wins the n-round i.f.-game on A and B. By the preceding Corollary,
this implies that C is de nable by an identity free sentence with the same quanti er rank
as '.
Suppose that the D wins the n-round i.f.-game on some A 2 C and B 62 C . Let A n B
mean that A and B are equivalent on all FO sentences of quanti er rank  n: We will
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de ne models A0 2 C , B 0 62 C such that A0 n B 0 , a contradiction. Given a model A, and
elements a0  a1 2 A, we say that a0 is a copy of a1 i the permutation (a0a1 ), permuting
a0 and a1 , is an automorphism of A. Let A0 B 0 ] be the extension of A B] obtained by
adding n ; 1 copies of every element of the structure. (For example, if A were the graph
with universe fa1  b1g, and edge relation E A = f(a1 b1)g, then A0 would be the graph with
universe fa1 : : : an  b1 : : :bn g and edge relation, E A = f(ai bj ) j i j  ng.) There are
obvious strict surjections from A0 and B 0 to A and B , respectively, and hence A0 2 C ,
B 0 62 C.
We now show that the D's winning strategy for the i.f.-game on A and B can be
easily adapted to provide a winning strategy for the standard n-round Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse
game on A0 and B 0 , demonstrating that A0 n B 0 . The basic idea is that the presence
of n copies of every element enables the D to modify her strategy from the i.f.-game as
follows. Whenever she is in a position where she would have played on a previously pebbled
element, she instead plays on a vacant copy of that element. That is, she maintains the
condition that if, through round m, pebbles have been placed on a0 = (a01 : : : a0m )  A0,
b0 = (b00 : : : b0m)  B 0, then she would win the i.f.-game on A and B with the pebbles on
a = (a1 : : : am), b = (b1 : : : bm), where each a0i b0i] is a copy of ai bi]. Suppose that she
maintains this condition through m rounds, m < n, and that in round m + 1, the S plays
on some unpebbled a0m+1 2 A0 . The D then plays on an unpebbled copy b0m+1 2 B 0 of some
bm+1 2 B such that (a  am+1  b  bm+1 ) is a winning position for the D in the i.f.-game on
A and B . Similarly if the S plays on B0 .
0

The next corollary follows immediately.

Corollary 5 For all classes C, if C 2 FO \ HOM, then it is denable by an identity free
sentence.

The above argument demonstrates the existence of an equivalent identity free sentence
 with the same quanti er rank as '. More generally, the idea of the above proof yields
signi cant information about the desired identity free sentences. For example, if ' is in
prenex form, we can establish that there is an identity free  with the same quanti er
pre x. The next corollary was needed in the proof of Proposition 21, above. It can be
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proved using the positive Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game from 22], described in Section 2, and
the positive i.f.-game. C is non-trivial i it is neither empty nor the class of all structures.

Corollary 6 Let C be a non-trivial class denable in FO(+ 6=) and closed under strict

surjections and reverse strict surjections. Then C is dened by an identity free sentence
of FO(+): If C = F  (resp. ), then it is dened by the sentence 9x(x = x) (resp. 9x(x 6=
x))].

4.2 Generalized preservation theorems for HOM and MON
In this section we discuss generalized preservation properties for the classes HOM and
MON. We pose various open problems in the same spirit as the question of whether
FO \ EXT is contained in the existential fragment of some stronger logic, from Chapter
1. One purpose of this investigation is to try to understand better the connection between
de nability in FO and in `resource bounded' fragments of L!1! . For example, the fact that
FO \ Datalog(:) 6= FO(9) means that there are classes in EXT ; FO(9) that are de nable
in two di erent extensions of FO(9) that are obtained by adding di erent `orthogonal'
mechanisms to the language|8 to get FO, and recursion to get Datalog(:).
The languages L!1! (9 +) and L!1! (+ 6=) are de ned in the obvious manner. We
view Datalog as LFP(9 +), and Datalog(:) as LFP(9). Positive LFP, LFP(+ 6=), extends
Datalog in allowing any FO(+ 6=) formula to occur in the body of a clause. The intensional
predicates are computed in the obvious manner. The following proposition is proved by
arguments analagous to those in the proof of Proposition 1.

Proposition 27

1. Datalog  L!1! (9 +)  HOM

2. LFP(+ 6=)  L!1! (+ 6=)  MON

In strict analogy to open problems posed above for EXT, we ask the following questions.
1. Is FO \ HOM  L!1! (9 +)?
2. Is FO \ HOM  Datalog?
3. Is FO \ MON  L!1! (+ 6=)?
4. Is FO \ MON  LFP(+ 6=)?
49

Ajtai and Gurevich 3] showed that FO \ Datalog = FO(9 +): Consequently, a positive
answer to the second question would imply the truth of the Homomorphism preservation
theorem over F . Observe also that their result contrasts with the known fact that FO \
Datalog(:) 6= FO(9): We now show that FO \ LFP(+) 6= FO(+ 6=): The class that we
de ne is based on a construction from Stolboushkin 22], which gives a simple proof that
Lyndon's lemma fails nitely.

Proposition 28 There is a FO-denable class C 2 MON such that
1. C is denable in LFP(+).
2. C is not denable in FO(+ 6=).
Therefore, FO \ LFP(+) 6= FO(+ 6=):
Proof. We de ne a class C which includes a class of structures that we call P,Q-orders,
based on the \grids" from 22]. A P Q-order, A, consists of two disjoint linear orders (with
some additional relations) of sets P A and QA , where P and Q are monadic predicates
in the signature. We verify directly that C is de nable in FO and in LFP(+). Using
a modi cation of Stolboushkin's idea, and the appropriate Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game for
FO(+ 6=), we then show that C is not FO(+ 6=)-de nable.

Denition 6 Let  = fPx Qx x < y Sxy Txy c dg. A is a P Q-order i
1. Every element a 2 A is in exactly one of the relations P and Q.
2. The relation x < y linearly orders the submodels P A and QA , and for all a 2 P A ,
b 2 QA , A j= :(a < b _ b < a).
3. Sxy is the successor relation on the submodels P A and QA , and for all a 2 P A ,
b 2 QA , A j= :(Sab _ Sba).
4. c is the <-minimal element in P A , and d is the <-minimal element in QA .
5. 8xy (Txy ! (Px ^ Qy ))
6. Tcd ^8x1x2 x3 x4((Px1 ^ Px2 ^ Qx3 ^ Qx4 ^ Tx1 x3 ) ! f(x3 < x4 ! Tx1 x4) ^ ((Sx1x2 ^
Sx3x4) ! Tx2x4 )g)

50

7. 9uvw(u < v ^ Tuw ^ Tvw ^ 8x(x < w ! :Tux))

It is obvious that the class of nite P Q-orders is de ned by some ' 2 FO. We now
de ne a sentence  2 FO(9 +), and let C = Modf (' _ ). We de ne i  0  i  5, as
W
follows, and let  = i5 i .

0 = 9x(Px ^ Qx) _ Qc _ Pd
1 = 9xy (Txy ^ (Py _ Qx))
2 = 9xy (x < y ^ ((Px ^ Qy) _ (Qx ^ Py )))
3 = 9xy (x < y ^ y < x)
4 = 9xyz(x < y ^ y < z ^ z < x)
5 = 9xyz(Sxy ^ (x = y _ y < x _ (x < y ^ y < z) _ (Px ^ Qy ) _ (Py ^ Qx)))
We claim that C is monotone. First, suppose that A 2 C satsi es : Since  is positive,
every enrichment of A also satsi es : Now suppose that A is a P Q-order. By considering
expansions of the di erent relations in the signature, it is easy to see that every enrichment
of A is also in C . For example, if B is obtained from A by expanding P A , then there is a
b 2 B such that B j= Pb ^ Qb. Thus, B j= : Similar considerations show that expanding
Qx Sxy or x < y also produces a model of : Finally, there are enrichments B of A such
that only the relation Txy is expanded and B 6j= , but it is easy to verify that any such
enrichment is a P Q-order.
We now show that C is LFP(+)-de nable. (Observe that, by Proposition 27, this also
provides an alternative proof that C is monotone.) We de ne in LFP(+) a relation Rxy
such that, over the class of P Q-orders, Rab holds i Pa ^ Qb ^ `height(b) < height(a)'.
Here, height(x) is the height of x in the linear order. Rxy is like Txy , except that it
consists of edges from P 's to Q's `pointing' in the other direction. Let Rxy be the relation
computed by the clause, Rxy ; (Px ^ y = d) _ 9wz (Rwz ^ Swx ^ Szy ).
The following sentences are components of the LFP(+) program to be de ned below.
Roughly, any model that satis es their conjunction is either a model of  or looks very
much like a P Q-order.
Let 0 = 8x(Px _ Qx) ^ 8xy ((Qx _ Qy _ x < y _ y < x _ x = y ) ^ (Px _ Py _ x <
y _ y < x _ x = y)). The second conjunct says that every pair of elements in P A QA] is
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connected by the relation x < y . For assume that no element of A is in both P and Q.
(Otherwise, we simply have that A j= .) Then 0 says that if x and y are distinct and in
P A , i.e. not in QA, then there is an <-edge connecting them. Likewise for x and y in QA .
Let 1 = 8xy 9z (Qx _ Qy _ x = y _ y < x _ Sxz ) ^8xy 9z (Px _ Py _ x = y _ y < x _ Sxz ):
This sentence says that every element that is not <-maximal has a `successor'. For example,
suppose that x and y are in P A ; QA , such that x < y: In particular, x is not maximal.
Then, by the rst conjunct, x has a successor.
Let 2 = 8xy (Qx _ Py _ (Rxy _ Txy )) ^ 9vw(Tvw ^ Rvw). This says that Txy behaves
in the appropriate way, by using the (inductively de ned) relation Rxy as its `complement'.
The following LFP(+) program de nes C .

Rxy ; (Px ^ y = d) _ 9wz(Rwz ^ Swx ^ Szy)
B ;  _ (

o^

1

^

2

)

Here, B is the distinguished Boolean predicate. Suppose that A 2 C . Either A j= , in
which case A is obviously in the class computed by the above program, or it is a P Q-order.
In the latter case, it is easy to verify that 0 1 and 2 are each satis ed in A, and hence
the value of the Boolean predicate B , on A, is true. To establish the containment in the
other direction, suppose that A is in the class computed by the program. If A 6j= , but
A j= 0 ^ 1 ^ 2, then it is straightforward to verify that A is a P Q-order.
The de nition of the preceding program exploits the following idea. Since every element
in a P Q-order, A, is either in P or Q, and since x < y linearly orders P A and QA , negation
can essentially be expresssed in a positive way. For example, A j= :Pa i A j= Qa. Also,
roughly, :x < y i x = y _ y < x. We also observe that, by making minor changes, one
can eliminate the symbols c d and Sxy from the vocabulary. For example, Sxy is actually
positively de nable over P Q-orders.
It remains to show that C is not de nable by a FO(+ 6=) sentence. We adapt a proof of
Stolboushkin's, from 22], in which the positive n-round Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game is introduced. The rules of this game are identical to those of the standard n-round EhrenfeuchtFraisse game, except that the D wins i the function, f (x), from A to B that sends each
pebble i to pebble i is a partial injective homomorphism between the induced submodels
of A and B . That is, the D must maintain the condition that for all k-ary relations, R,
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and all k-tuples of pebbles 0 , if A j= R(0 ), then B j= R(f (0 )). We de ne A +n B to
mean that for all sentences ' 2 FO(+ 6=), with qr(')  n, if A j= ', then B j= ':

Proposition 29 (Stolboushkin 22]) For all A and B, and all n, the following conditions are equivalent.
1. A

+n

B.

2. The D has a winning strategy in the positive n-round game on A and B .

To prove that C 62 FO(+ 6=), it suces to show that for all n, there are A 2 C  B 62 C
such that A +n B . We de ne A to be a P Q-order, and B to be an impoverishment
of A, obtained by removing a single T -edge. Let the universe of A be the set of ordered
pairs f(w h) j w 2 f0 1g and 0  h  2n+2 g, with P A resp. QA ] the set of elements of
the form (0 h)resp. (1 h)]. A j= (w h) < (w0 h0) i w = w0 and h < h0 . The relation
x < y A uniquely determines the the interpretation of Sxy  cA = (0 0) dA = (1 0). Finally,
T A = f((w h) (w0 h0)) j w = 0 w0 = 1, and h  h0g  f((0 2n+2) (1 2n+2 ; 1))g. B is
identical to A, except that T B = T A ; f((0 2n+1) (1 2n+1))g. It is easy to verify that
A 2 C , and that B 62 C .
We now describe a winning strategy for the D in the n-round positive game on A and
B. In each round, she either plays on the same element, on the other structure, as the S,
or she plays on its S -predecessor or successor. Roughly, on P or far from the midpoints,
(0 2n+1) and (1 2n+1), the D copies the S's moves, and near the midpoints and in Q, she
plays so that the pebbles, on B , are shifted one higher than their  counterparts. In
any round m, if S plays on (0 h), in either A or B , then the D plays on (0 h) in the other
model. In round 1, if the S plays on (1 h) and d(h 2n+1 ) =j h ; 2n+1 j> 2n , then the D also
plays on (1 h). Otherwise, the D plays a `shift' so that 1 = (1 h0) and 1 = (1 h0 + 1),
with h0 = h or h ; 1, depending on whether or not the S played on A. In this case, we
say that the pebble pair is shifted. In each round m + 1, let Im+1 be the smallest interval
sm+1  tm+1 ] 0 < sm+1  tm+1 < 2n+2 that contains 2n+1 and the h-component, hl , of
any shifted pebble l l  m. If no pebbles have been shifted through round m, then
Im+1 is the degenerate interval 2n+1 2n+1]. In round m + 1, the D copies the S's move,
m+1 = (1 hm+1) if the distance from hm+1 to the interval Im+1 is greater than 2(n+1);m.
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Otherwise, the D plays a shift, exactly as described for the rst round. It is easy to see
that this provides the D with a winning strategy.
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Chapter 5

Modal logic over nite structures
In this chapter, we discuss the nite model theory of the language of propositional modal
logic, PM. Modal logic has been studied extensively in connection with philosophical logic.
More recently, connections have emerged between modal logic and computational linguistics and certain areas of computer science. Below we will be interested in the `classical
model theory' of modal logic, an approach taken by van Benthem and others. For example,
PM satis es certain preservation theorems that are analogous to classical theorems for FO.
We show that, in contrast to more expressive logics, PM remains well-behaved over F as
various classical results remain true over the class of nite models.
In order to make this chapter self-contained, we briey describe the syntax and semantics of PM. Most of this material is well-known, and more detailed descriptions can be
found in many places, (e.g. see 8]). The syntax of PM is obtained from that of simple
sentential logic by adding the two modal operators 2', necessarily ', and 3', possibly
'. Over a signature of proposition symbols,  = fp1 : : : pk g, the class of sentences of
PM( ) is the smallest class containing each atomic sentence pi and closed under negation, conjunction, disjunction, and the operators 2 and 3. We will always assume that
the signature is nite and non-empty. A (Kripke) model of PM( ) is a directed graph A
with additional unary predicates fP1  : : : Pk g, corresponding to each proposition symbol.
The edge relation Rxy is often called the `accessibility relation', and we will say that b is
accessible from a just in case Rab:

Denition 7 Satisfaction for sentences of PM at a node (or world) is dened inductively.
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1. (A a)j=PM pi i A j= Pi (a):
2. The Boolean operations are given their standard interpretations.
3. For the modal operator necessarily, (A a)j=PM 2q i for all b 2 A such that A j=
Rab (A b)j=PM q. Possibly is dened dually, (A a)j=PM 3q i there is some b 2 A
such that A j= Rab and (A b)j=PM q .

This semantics suggest a natural interpretation of PM into FO. In fact, by reusing
variables we can translate PM into the language L2 . Since sentences of PM are evaluated
at a node of the Kripke model, they naturally translate into FO-formulas with one free
variable. In order to keep the image of the translation in L2 , we will simultaneously
de ne two functions, 0 (') and 1 (') such that (i) d (') contains xd free and (ii) for
all ' 2 PM 1(') is obtainable from 0 (') by replacing every occurrence of x0 by x1,
and vice-versa. The functions d (') from sentences of PM to formulas of L2 are de ned
inductively as follows:

d (pj ) = Pj (xd)
d (q1 ^ q2) = d (q1 ) ^ d (q2)
d (:q) = :d (q)
d (2q) = 8x1;d(Rxd x1;d ! 1;d (q))
d (3q) = 9x1;d (Rxdx1;d ^ 1;d (q))
To simplify the exposition, we add a single constant c to our FO-signature, to convert each
formula with one free variable into a sentence. Let (') be the function from PM to L2
such that for all ' 2 PM (') is obtained from 0 (') by replacing each free occurence
of x0 by c. Then each model is viewed as having a distinguished node, at which modal
sentences are evaluated. Let FOM , the modal fragment of rst order logic, be the image of
PM under the mapping (').
In his dissertation 7], van Benthem gave an algebraic characterization of FO-de nable
classes that are de nable by a modal sentence. He introduced the following important
notion.
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Denition 8 Given two models A and B (with distinguished nodes cA and cB ), a bisimulation between A and B , is a binary relation, , contained in A  B , such that
1. cA  cB
2. For all a b such that a  b, if A j= Raa0B j= Rbb0], then there is a b0 2 B a0 2 A]
such that a0  b0
3. For all a b such that a  b, and all Pj  A j= Pj (a) i B j= Pj (b).
We say that A bisimulates with B i there is a bisimulation between the two models. We
also write (A a)  (B b) if there is a bisimulation  between A and B such that a  b:

Bisimulation is an equivalence relation on structures, which can be seen as a modi ed,
weak kind of partial isomorphism. It is easy to see that if there is a bisimulation between
a pair of models, then they satisfy the same modal sentences.
Van Benthem proved the following preservation theorem: a FO-de nable class of models is closed under bisimulations i it can be de ned by a sentence in FOM . Below we
prove that this result remains true over F . We then show that an `existential' preservation
theorem, due to van Benthem and Visser (see 5]), also holds over the class of nite structures. Finally, we give an alternative proof, which does not use the compactness theorem,
of Andreka, van Benthem, and Nemeti's result 5] establishing the modal analog of the
Craig interpolation theorem.

5.1 Background
In this section, we present background information needed for the proofs of the main results
that appear in Section 2. Our development of this material closely parallels analogous
results for both FO and for the various nite variable logics. We rst de ne an in nite
game to characterize full bisimulation. We then introduce nite versions of the game, and
the notion of `n-bisimulation', and determine their connection to modal de nability.
In the (eternal) modal Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game the Spoiler and the Duplicator play
a modi ed two pebble Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game, with pebble pairs (0  0) (1 1). At
the start of the game, pebbles 0 and 0 are on cA and cB , respectively. In round 1, the S
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either places 1 on some element of A such that A j= R01 or places 1 on some element
of B such that B j= R 0 1 . The D then does the same on the other structure. In each
subsequent round n + 1, the Spoiler chooses a pair (i  i) of pebbles, already in play, and
replays either i on A such that A j= R1;i i or i on B such that B j= R 1;i i. The D
then plays the other pebble on the other structure in accordance with the same restriction.
Each player loses immediately if he or she cannot make a legal move. The Spoiler wins at
round n if there is Pm such that A j= Pm i i B 6j= Pm i . (Observe that the Duplicator
does not have to play so that the partial mapping from A to B induced by the pebbles is a
partial isomorphism|e.g. in some round, she could play 1 on the same element as 0 in
B, even if S had not just played 1 on 0 in A. This is because sentences of FOM do not
contain equality.) The Duplicator wins the game, just in case, in every round the Spoiler
does not win. The following proposition is straightforward.

Proposition 30 For all A and B of signature , the following conditions are equivalent:
1. There is a bisimulation between A and B .
2. The Duplicator has a winning strategy in the modal game on A on B .

We turn our attention now to modal de nability.

Denition 9 The quantier rank of a formula, qr('), is dened inductively.
1. qr(Pi ) = 0
2. qr(:') = qr(')
3. qr('1 ^ '2) = qr('1 _ '2) = max(qr('1) qr('2))
4. qr(3') = qr(2') = qr(') + 1

Of course, there are no genuine quanti ers in PM the choice of terminology emphasizes
the connection between PM and FO. In particular, for all ' 2 PM, qr(') equals the
quanti er rank of the FO-sentence, ('). Let PMn be the set of sentences of quanti er
rank  n. Given a model A, the PMn -theory of A is then the set of sentences, of quanti er
rank  n, satis ed by A.
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Lemma 7 Let  be a xed signature.
1. For all n, up to logical equivalence, there are nitely many sentences of PMn .
2. There is a recursive function f (n) that generates a (nite) list of all sentences, up
to logical equivalence, of quantier rank  n.
3. For all A, the PMn -theory of A is nitely axiomatizable.
Proof. We prove Part 1 by induction on n. The case n = 0 is obvious. For n + 1, observe
that every sentence of quanti er rank  n + 1 is a Boolean combination of sentences of the
form 3, with qr()  n. Parts 2 and 3 follow easily from Part 1.

Denition 10 We say that there is an n-bisimulation between A and B, written A n B,
i there is a sequence of relations 0  : : : n , each on A  B , such that
1. cA 0 cB
2. For all m < n, if a m b, and A j= Raa0 then there is a b0 2 B such that B j= Rbb0
and a0 m+1 b0and vice-versa].
3. For all m  n, if a m b, then for all Pj  A j= Pj (a) i B j= Pj (b).

Intuitively, A n B means that A and B bisimulate `up to depth n'. Observe that
A  B implies A n B, for all n, and that n also de nes an equivalence relation on
classes of structures. By xing a bound on the number of rounds in a game, we get the
n-round modal Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game. Then the following proposition can be proved
by straightforward modi cation of standard results connecting Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games
to logical expressibility.

Proposition 31 For all n, and A and B over some , the following conditions are equivalent:

1. There is an n-bisimulation between A and B .
2. The Duplicator has a winning strategy in the n-round modal game on A on B .
3. For all modal formulas  of quantier rank  n, A j=  i B j= .
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The next proposition follows easily from Proposition 31 and Lemma 7.

Proposition 32 Let C be any class of models, closed under isomorphism. Let C 0 be any
subclass of C , also closed under isomorphism. Then, for all n, the following conditions are
equivalent:
1. For all A 2 C 0 B 2 C ; C 0 A 6n B:
2. For all A 2 C 0 B 2 C ; C 0, the S wins the n-round modal game on A and B .
3. There is a modal sentence of quantier rank  n that denes the class C 0 over C .

Bisimulation and n-bisimulation are rather weak equivalence relations, in the sense
that they determine relatively large equivalence classes. In other words, for every model
A there are many other models with the same modal theory. Our proofs will exploit this
feature repeatedly.
We x the following terminology.

Denition 11 The children of a in A are those b such that A j= Rab. We say that b is a

descendent of a i there is a directed path from a to b. For all n b is an n-descendent of
a if there is a path of length  n from a to b. The family of a, written F a is the submodel
of A with universe fag  fb j b is a descendent of ag. For all a and b, we say that a and b
are disjoint i Fa \ Fb = .
The r-neighborhood of a point a, denoted Nr (a), is dened inductively. N0(a) is the
submodel of A with universe fag. For all r + 1, b 2 Nr+1 (a) i b 2 Nr (a) or there is an
a0 2 Nr(a) such that A j= Ra0b _ Rba0. An r-tree is a directed tree rooted at c of height
 r. An r-pseudotree is a model such that Nr (c) is a tree such that all distinct pairs of its
leaves are disjoint, as dened above.

We now describe certain operations on models that produce either bisimilar or nbisimilar models. For A and a, we say that A0 is obtained from A by adding a copy of
the family of a i A0 is the extension of A with universe the disjoint union of A and of
F a such that for all a 2 A and a01 2 F 0a, the `copy' of F a in A0 , A0 j= Raa01Ra01a] i
A j= Raa1Ra1a], where a01 is the copy of a1 2 F a . The binary relation f(a a0) j a 2
A a0 2 A0 and a = a0 or a0 is a copy of ag witnesses that A  A0.
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Another concept from modal logic is that of unraveling a structure to produce another
structure with which it bisimulates. Before de ning this notion, we give a simple illustration. Let A be the graph on one vertex with a loop, and let A0 be the directed chain
on c = 0 1 : : : n such that for all m < n A0 j= Rm m + 1 and A0 j= Rnn: We can view
A0 as having been obtained from A by unraveling, or unwinding, the loop n times. The
set A  A0 is itself a bisimulation between A and A0 . In general, any model A can be
n-unraveled, so that the n-descendents of c form an n-tree. By !-unraveling F c in A we
obtain a (possibly in nite) tree. Every unraveling of A bisimulates with A.
To simplify the de nition, we assume that every element of A is a descendent of c, i.e
A = F c . The n-unraveling of A will be an n-pseudotree, which we call A0 . We rst describe
the tree portion of A0 , that is, Nn (cA ). The root of the tree will be c itself and, for each
path in A of length s  n starting at c, there is a node of height s in the tree. Thus, each
node is indexed by a path a = (c = a0  a1 : : : as) that is, a sequence of length s + 1] such
that for all q < s A j= Raq aq+1 . Given a path a and an element a0 2 A, let a  a0 denote
their concatenation, that is, (a0 a1 : : : as  a0). For each such a A0 j= Pj (a) i A j= Pj (as ).
In A0, there is an edge from a to a1 i a1 = a  a0, for some a0 2 A. This completes the
description of the n-tree which is the n-neighborhood of c in A0 . We now attach copies of
families to the leaves of this tree of height n, to obtain the n-pseudotree A0 . That is, at
each node a = (c = a0  a1 : : : an ), we attach a copy of F an , identifying the elements a and
an. There may be many copies of any family, but each pair of families is disjoint. It is now
easy to construct a bisimulation between A and A0 . The ! -unraveling is de ned similarly,
except that no families are attached to any nodes.
We collect together some easy to verify facts for later use.
0

Proposition 33 For all A, 1. A  FAc . 2. A bisimulates with a tree rooted at c, its

!-unraveling. 3. A bisimulates with an n-pseudotree, its n-unraveling. 4. A n-bisimulates
with an n-tree, a submodel of its n-unraveling. 5. Over a xed signature  , there is a
recursive function f (x) such that for all modal sentences ' of quantier rank  n, if '
is satisable, by a nite or innite model, then it is satisable by an n-tree of cardinality
 f (n). 6. For all nite A, the modal theory of A is nitely axiomatizable i F c is acyclic.
Proof. We provide proofs of Facts 5 and 6. From Fact 4 and Proposition 31, it is clear that
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for all ' 2 PMn  ' is satis able i it is satis ed by an n-tree. Given a xed nite signature
 , we now de ne an e ective procedure that maps each natural number n into a nite
set of n-trees T n such that for all ' 2 PM( ) of quanti er rank  n, if ' is satis able,
then it is satis ed in some A 2 T n . This will suce to establish the claim. The sets T n
are de ned inductively. T 1 contains every model, up to isomorphism, with exactly one
element, and has cardinality = 2jj . For n + 1 A 2 T n+1 i A 2 T n or A is an n-tree
rooted at c with children a1 : : : ak satisfying the following properties: (i) for all i  k,
the family F ai is isomorphic to some tree B 2 T n  and (ii) for all i 6= j  k F ai 6
= F aj .
It is easy to verify both that there is a recursive bound on the size of models in each T n
and that every n-tree bisimulates with an n-tree in T n . This establishes Fact 5.
We now prove Fact 6. Suppose that F c is acylic. We show, by induction on the
height n of F c , that A is axiomatized by a sentence of quanti er rank = n + 1: For
n = 0, let  = (VP 2 P ^ VQ2; :Q) ^ (:3P 0 ^ 2P 0 ), where  is the set of proposition
symbols satis ed at c, and P 0 is any proposition symbol in : For n 1, and each child
ai of c, let i be a sentence that axiomatizes the family F ai . Then let  = (VP 2 P ^
VQ2; :Q) ^ (Vi 3i) ^ (2 Wi i). It is clear that  axiomatizes the modal theory of A. In
the other direction, let A be such that F c contains a cycle, and let  be a modal sentence
of quanti er rank n. Let B be an n-tree that veri es : It is easy to show that there is
a modal sentence, , of quanti er rank = n + 1 true in A but not in B . For example,
let = 3(: : : 3(P _ :P ) : : :) contain a string of n + 1 3's, for any P 2  . Therefore the
modal theory of A is not axiomatized by any sentence of quanti er rank n, and hence is
not nitely axiomatizable.
Observe that Fact 5 implies some well-known results. One, a modal formula is satis able
i it is satis able by a nite Kripke model. Two, it is decidable whether a formula is
satis able, both over the class of all structures and over F .

5.2 Preservation theorems
In this section, we show that two modal preservation theorems remain valid over the class
F . The arguments do not use niteness in any essential way therefore they also give
alternative proofs of the theorems in the general case that do not rely on the Compactness
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theorem. Finally, we show how these methods can be used to reprove the modal version
of the Craig interpolation theorem without employing compactness.

Proposition 34 The bisimulation preservation theorem for modal sentences remains true

in the nite case. That is, a class C is FO-denable and closed under bisimulations i it
is denable by a modal sentence.
Proof. Let C be a FO-de nable class that is closed under bisimulations. Suppose that C
is not de nable by a modal formula. By Proposition 32, this implies that for all n, there
are A 2 C and B 62 C such that A n B . (Of course, since C is closed under bisimulations,
we have that A 6 B .) We will show that this condition implies that for all n, there are
actually A 2 C and B 62 C such that A n B . (Recall that A n B means that for all ' 2 FO,
with qr(')  n, A j= ' i B j= '.) This immediately implies that C is not FO-de nable,
a contradiction.
More speci cally, we show that there is a function l(x) such that, for all n, if A l(n) B ,
then there are A0 and B 0 such that A  A0 B  B 0 and A0 n B 0 . By choosing A 2 C and
B 62 C , we get A0 2 C and B 0 62 C . Given A and B , we nd A0 and B0 by modifying A and
B in a sequence of steps, as described in the following lemmas.

Lemma 8 Let A and B be such that A t B. Then there are t-pseudotrees A0 and B0

such that A  A0 B  B 0 , and A0 t B 0 .

Let A0 and B 0 be the t-unravelings of A and B . Then A0 and B 0 are t-pseudotrees such
that A  A0 and B  B 0 . By the transitivity of t , this implies that A0 t B 0 .

Lemma 9 Let A and B be t-pseudotrees such that A t B. Then there are t-pseudotrees

A0 and B0 such that A  A0, B  B 0 , and Nt(cA ) 
= Nt(cB ).
0

0

The proof describes an algorithm for modifying the two models in a sequence of steps
that yields models with isomorphic t-neighborhoods of c. After each step s s  t, we
have models As and Bs such that A  As and B  Bs , and cAs and cBs have isomorphic
s-neighborhoods. At each step s + 1, As+1 resp. Bs+1 ] is obtained from As by adding
copies of families of nodes of distance s + 1 from c.
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Let fa1  : : :al  b1 : : : bmg be the set of the children of c in A and B . The relation t;1
induces an equivalence relation on this set such that each equivalence class has at least
one member in each of A and B . To obtain A1 and B1 with isomorphic 1-neighborhoods
of c that bisimulate with A and B , it suces to add enough copies of families of the cchildren ai and bj such that each equivalence class has an equal number of members in
A1 and B1. For example, renumbering the indices of c-children if necessary, suppose that
fa1 : : : ai b1 : : :bj g is one such equivalence class. Also, without loss of generality, assume
that i  j . Then A1 will contain j ; i additional copies of the family F ai : Let g1 (x) be a
bijection between the c-children in A1 and B1 such that for all ai , (A1 ai ) t;1 (B1  g1(ai )).
By iterating this procedure, at each step s + 1, we obtain As+1 and Bs+1 , and a bijection
gs+1 between nodes of distance s + 1 from cA and cB with the following properties. For
all nodes ai in As of distance s from c, the bijection gs+1 maps the children of ai to those
of gs (ai), and for all a 2 dom(gs+1 ) (As+1 a) t;(s+1) (Bs+1  gs+1(a)). Finally, we choose
A0 and B 0 to be the models At and Bt.
Together, these lemmas establish that there are models A 2 C and B 62 C that look
rather similar. In particular, for all t, there are t-pseudotrees A 2 C and B 62 C such that
Nt(cA) 
= Nt (cB ): Although these models have isomorphic t-neighborhoods of c, we still
know nothing about the other part of each model, which might make A and B `look very
di erent' in FO. The nal step of the proof takes care of this by using a version of Hanf's
lemma.

Proposition 35 (Hanf 16]) For each signature , there is a function f (x) with the following property. For all n, A and B , if there is a bijection h : A 7! B such that for all
a 2 A, Nf (n)(a) 
= Nf (n)(h(a)), (with a and h(a) distinguished), then A n B .

Lemma 10 Let A and B be (3f (n))-pseudotrees with N3f (n)(cA) = N3f (n)(cB ), where
f (x) is the Hanf function. Then there are A0 and B0 such that A  A0, B
A0 n B 0 :



B0 , and

Each of A0 and B 0 will be obtained from A and B , respectively, by extending the original
model by adding disjoint components in such a way that it will be obvious that A0 and
B0 possess the same f (n)-nbhds. It is clear that extending models in such a way does not
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a ect bisimulations. Let A0 B0 ] be the submodel of A B ] with universe A ; Nf (n)(cA )
B ; Nf (n)(cB )]. We de ne A0 B 0 ] to be the disjoint union of A and B0 B and A0]. We've
added to A the part of B that may look very di erent from it, and vice-versa, so that
A0 will look the same `locally' as B0 . In particular, for example, it is easy to see that
card(A0) = card(B0). We now de ne a bijection between these models in 3 parts. Let
g (x) be an isomorphism between N3f (n)(cA) in A and N3f (n)(cB) in B . De ne h1(x) to be
the bijection between N2f (n)(cA ) and N2f (n)(cB ) that is a restriction of the isomorphism
g (x). Let A1 be the submodel of A0 whose universe is those elements of B0 that are in
N2f (n)(cB ) (viewing B0 here as a submodel of B.) We de ne B1 similarily. Let h2 be the
bijection between A1 and B1 that is also a restriction of the isomorphism g (x). Let h3 be
the bijection between the remaining pieces of A0 and B 0 that takes the `A-part' of A0 to
the `A-part' of B 0 , and the B -part of A0 to the B -part of B 0 . It is then easy to verify that
h = h1  h2  h3 is a bijection from A0 to B0 that `preserves f (n)-nbhds'. (This is perhaps
easier to see if one draws a picture.) Thus A0 n B 0 as desired.
To complete the proof, all that remains is to combine the above results. Suppose that
C is FO-de nable, closed under bisimulations, but not de nable by a modal formula. Then
by Lemmas 8, 9, and 10, for all n, there are A 2 C and B 62 C such that A n B . But this
implies that C is not FO-de nable, a contradiction. This proves the proposition.
The next preservation theorem that we consider characterizes those sentences whose
classes of models are closed under extensions. Before stating the main result, we de ne
some terminology and prove a few preliminary lemmas.

Denition 12

1. A 3-sentence is a modal sentence built up from atomic propositions
and negated atomic propositions using ^, _, and 3.

2. For all A and B , we write A  B i for all 3-sentences ', if A j= ', then B j= '.
3. Given a model A, the 3-theory of A is the set of 3-sentences satised by A.

Observe that the 3-sentences are precisely those ' 2 PM such that (') is an existential
FO sentence. In particular, the class of models of any 3-sentence is closed under extensions.

Lemma 11 Let A be an n-tree, rooted at c.
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1. For all 3-sentences, ', of quantier rank

n + 1, A 6j= '.

2. The 3-theory of A is axiomatized by a sentence of quantier rank = n.
Proof. Part 1 is obvious, since A does not contain any paths of length n + 1: By Lemma 7,
let 1  : : :k be the set of all 3-sentences of quanti er rank  n, up to equivalence, satis ed
V
in A. By Part 1, it is clear that  = i axiomatizes the 3-theory of A.

Lemma 12 Given a xed signature, there is a nite set of n-trees, T n = fB1 : : : Bv g

such that for all A, there is a u  v such that A n Bu . Furthermore, T n can be obtained
e ectively.
Proof. This result follows easily from Fact 5 of Proposition 33. Let T n be the same set that
was de ned in the proof of this Fact, such that every satis able sentence ' of quanti er
rank  n is satis ed by some B 2 T n . Let A be any model, and let n 2 PMn axiomatize
its PMn -theory, again using Lemma 7. By Fact 5, there is a B 2 T n such that B j= n .
This now implies that A n B .

The next result can be viewed as the modal version of the Los-Tarski theorem for nite
structures.

Proposition 36 The existential preservation theorem for modal logic remains true over F .
That is, for all ', if Modf (') 2 EXT, then ' is equivalent to a 3-sentence . Moreover,
there is an e ective procedure for nding the equivalent 3-sentence.
Proof. Let C 2 EXT be de ned by some sentence ', with quanti er rank n. Let C n =
C \ T n = fD1 : : : Dk g. For each Di  i  k let i axiomatize the 3-theory of Di . By
W
Lemma 11, qr(i ) = n: Let  = ik i . We claim that ' is equivalent to .
First we show that ' implies . Suppose that A j= '. We claim that there is a D 2 C n
such that A n D: By Lemma 12, there is a B 2 T n such that A n B: Since C is closed
under n -equivalence, B must actually be in C , and hence in C n . Let D = B . There is
some i , as de ned above, such that D j= i . Since qr(i )  n, this implies that A j= i ,
and hence A j= :
Now we prove the opposite direction,  implies '. Suppose that A j= . Then A j= i ,
for some i  k. By Lemma 12, there is a B 2 T n such that A n B . Observe that
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Di  B. We want to show that there is an A0 such that (i) B  A0, and hence A n A0
and (ii) Di  A0 . As Di 2 C , and C 2 EXT, (i) and (ii) imply that A0 2 C : Since C is
closed under n -equivalence, A 2 C , as desired. Thus, it suces to establish the following
lemma.

Lemma 13 Let B D be trees such that D  B. Then there is a m-tree A0, m  n, such
that B  A0 and D  A0 .

By induction, on the height n of D. For n = 0, it is obvious that D  B , since D is just
the single node cD , and for all predicate symbols p, D j= p i B j= p. Let A0 = B:
Consider n > 0. Let fd1 : : : ds g and fb1 : : :btg be the children of cD and cB , respectively. We claim that for each dp , there is a br such that F dp  F br . Let , with
qr( )  n, axiomatize the 3-theory of F dp . Then D j= 3 , and therefore B j= 3 . Thus
there is a br such that F br j= , as desired.
By adding extra copies of families of the children of cB to B , if necessary, we get B 0
such that B  B 0 and there is an injection h : fd1 : : :ds g ;! fb01 : : : b0t g, b0j 2 B 0 , such
that F di  F h(di ) . By the induction hypothesis, each such F h(di ) bisimulates with an
(n ; 1)-tree, T h(di ) , such that F di  T h(di ) . Let A0 be obtained from B 0 by replacing each
subtree F h(di )  B 0 , with the tree T h(di ) . It is easy to see that B  A0 and D  A0 .
0

This also completes the proof of the proposition.

Corollary 7 For every modal sentence ', there is a decision procedure that determines
whether Modf (') Mod(')] is closed under extensions. Therefore the set of sentences that
dene such classes is recursive.

Proof. By the proof of the previous proposition, if Modf (') Mod(')] 2 EXT, then it is
equivalent to a 3-sentence of quanti er rank  qr('). By Lemma 7, one can e ectively
list, up to logical equivalence, all such sentences, 1 : : : l. Then it suces to test the
validity of each sentence, ' $ i, which is decidable.

We now turn to an interpolation theorem, due to Andreka, van Benthem, and Nemeti.
It will be convenient to introduce briey a fragment of second order propositional modal
logic, which allows quanti cation over propositions. We often use P , etc., as shorthand
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for sequences, (P1  : : : Pn). We write (P ) to indicate that the set of proposition symbols
that occur in equals P . Also, by 9P (P Q) we mean the sentence 9P1 : : : 9Pn (P Q).

Denition 13 Let '(P Q) be a sentence of PM, such that P \ Q = : Then 9Q'(P Q)

is a %11 modal sentence for all A, with signature  = P , A j= 9Q'(P Q) i there is a B ,
an expansion of A with signature  = P  Q, such that B j= '(P Q). &11 modal sentences,
of the form 8Q'(P Q), are dened similarly.

For all A B , and n, we write A Pn B i for all sentences ' qr(')  n, that only
contain proposition symbols from P , A j= ' i B j= '. Recall that every satis able modal
sentence is satisifed by a nite model hence ' implies  over the class of all models i '
implies  over F . By this fact, the truth of the interpolation theorem in the general case
immediately yields its truth over F .

Proposition 37 (Andreka, van Benthem, and Nemeti 5]) Let ' and  be modal
sentences, with signatures ' and  , such that ' \  is non-empty. If ' implies 
(over F ), then there is a sentence , with   ' \  , such that ' implies and
implies : Furthermore, qr( )  max(qr(') qr()).

Proof. Suppose that '(P Q) implies (P R), where P Q and R are pairwise disjoint
sequences of propositions symbols. Equivalently, 9Q'(P Q) implies 8R(P  R). Thus, we
consider models over the signature  = P : Let n = max(qr(') qr()). Recall that, by
Lemma 7 or 12, there are only nitely many Pn equivalence classes. We claim that it
suces to show that for any Pn class C , if there is an A 2 C such that A j= 9Q'(P Q),
then for all B 2 C , B j= 8R(P  R): If this is true, for each Pn class C containing an A
that satis es 9Q'(P Q), let i be a sentence with signature P , qr(i )  n, that de nes
the class. (Here we use that P is non-empty, since no sentence contains no proposition
W
symbols.) Then  = i is an interpolant.
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there are A and B such that A Pn B , A j=
9Q'(P Q) and B j= 9R:(P  R): Let A0 and B 0 be expansions of A and B such that
A0 j= '(P Q) and B 0 j= :(P  R). By Lemma 12, there are n-trees A00 and B 00 that are
n -equivalent to A0 and B 0 , respectively. Finally, let A1 and B1 be the  -reducts of A00
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and B 00 . It is clear that A1 j= 9Q'(P Q) and B1 j= 9R:(P  R): We now want to nd a
D such that D j= 9Q'(P Q) ^ 9R:(P  R): This will establish the contradiction.
D is constructed by extending A1 and B1 `simultaneously' by iteratively adding copies
of families of elements. First we show that for any model M , if M 0 is obtained from M
by adding a copy of a family F m , for any m 2 M , then every %11 sentence satis ed in M
is also satis ed in M 0: Suppose that M j= 9P (P Q). Let N be an expansion of M that
veri es the ( rst-order) modal sentence (P Q) and let N 0 be obtained from N by adding
a copy of the family of m. It is clear that N  N 0 thus N 0 j= (P Q). Since N 0 is an
expansion of M 0, M 0 j= 9P (P Q), as desired.
We now describe the construction of D. As in the proof of Lemma 9, n;1 induces an
equivalence relation on the set of children of cA1 and cB1 such that every equivalence class
has at least one member in each model. Let A2 and B2 be obtained from A1 and B1 by
adding enough copies of families of these children so that there is a bijection g1(x) from
the children of cA2 to those of cB2 such that for all ai , F ai n;1 F g1 (ai ) . Observe that
N1(cA2 ) 
= N1(cB2 ). Repeat this procedure at each level m  n of the trees, on pairs of
subtrees in Am and Bm determined by the bijection gm;1 (x) at the previous level. By the
argument of the preceding paragraph, for all m, Am j= 9Q'(P Q) and Bm j= 9R:(P  R):
Furthermore, Nm(cAm+1 ) 
= Nm (cBm+1 ) This construction yields trees An+1 and Bn+1 such
that A1  An+1 , B1  Bn+1 , and An+1 
= Bn+1 . Let D = An+1 .
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Chapter 6

Conclusion
In this dissertation, we have investigated the prospects for the development of positive
model theoretic results over the class of nite structures. Regarding preservation theorems,
these prospects appear to be somewhat mixed. The positive results that we establish have
been for weaker, less expressive, languages, such as propositional modal logic, L2, and `low'
quantifer pre x classes of FO, and for classes with strong closure conditions, e.g. HOM.
In particular, results from Chapter 5 indicate that modal logic remains well-behaved over
F . One way to try to extend this work would be to try achieve similar results for stronger
levels of the bounded quanti er hierarchy introduced in 5]. It is also unknown whether
existential preservation holds for L2, both over F and over the class of all structures (see
4]), and whether homomorphism preservation holds for Lk  k 3. We have also given a
partial positive answer to what is perhaps the major open question in this area, does the
Homomorphism preservation theorem hold over F ?
The situation regarding generalized preservation theorems for the class EXT is now
fairly well understood. Grohe's proof that FO \ EXT 6 L!1! (9) essentially yields a de nitive, negative, answer to the questions that appear at the end of Section 1.2. One may still
ask, for which quantifer pre x classes, w, is FOw] \ EXT  L!1! (9)? We can also raise
analogous questions for the class HOM.
1. Is FO \ HOM  L!1! (9 +)?
2. Is FO \ HOM  Datalog?
3. Is L!1! \ HOM  L!1! (9 +)?
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Observe that, by Ajtai and Gurevich's result, a positive answer to question 2 would imply
the truth of the Homomorphism preservation theorem over F .
Finally, I would like to mention several questions that arise in connection with the
results from Chapter 2. Recall that for all k, there is a single nite model that satis es the
set, 9k , of all consistent sentences of Lk (9). By Proposition 15, Modf (9k ) is not de nable
W
W
in Lk (9) of course, it may be de nable in Lk (9), for some k0 > k: We ask, instead,
the following related question.
0

1. For k 2, is Modf (9k ) in FO(9)?
Recall also that for any model Ak of the k-Gaifman theory, ;k , Ak j= 9k : Let C k = fA j
there is a B such that B  A and B j= ;k g, the `upward closure' of Modf (;k ). It is clear
that for all k, C k  Modf (9k ), but we do not know whether the classes are equal.
2. For k 2, is C k = Modf (9k )?
3. For k 2, is C k in FO(9)?
The nal question can be reformulated as a problem in combinatorics. It is equivalent to
asking whether there is a nite set, fB1  : : : Bn g, of models with the `k-extension property'
such that for every model with this property, there is some such Bi embedded in it.
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